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CLEAN SLATE: EXPANDING EXPUNGEMENTS AND
PARDONS FOR NON-VIOLENT FEDERAL OFFENDERS
Lahny R. Silva*

Over the past forty years, the United States Congress has passed
legislation expanding the federal criminal code intruding into an area
typically reserved to the states. The “tough on crime” rhetoric of the
1980s and 1990s brought with it the enactment of various legislative
initiatives: harsh mandatory minimum sentences for non-violent
federal offenders, “truth in sentencing” laws that restricted or
abolished parole and early release, and strict liability
disqualifications from employment and federal benefits based solely
on the fact of conviction. The effect of this legislation was the
creation of a new criminal class: a federal prison population.
However, unlike the states the federal government does not have a
legal mechanism in place adequately reintegrating federal offenders
back into the American polity. This has contributed to soaring federal
incarceration rates, rising government costs for corrections, and a
historically high rate of criminal recidivism. This is a price tag the
United States can no longer afford to pay.
This Article argues that individuals who have served their sentences
and abided by the law for some period afterward should be given the
opportunity to rid their slates of their criminal histories. Such
expungement of criminal convictions for individuals who demonstrate
that they will abide by the law are likely to reduce the costs of the
criminal justice system and improve the lives of ex-offenders. First,
this Article examines post-conviction penalties and contemporary
recidivism trends. Second, this Article investigates the law governing
federal pardons and judicial expungements, finding that the doctrines
and their applications lack consistency, making it difficult for non* J.D. University of Connecticut 2007; Hastie Fellow and LLM Candidate University of
Wisconsin. I would like to extend special thanks to my team who graciously reviewed multiple drafts of
this piece: Professor Peter Carstensen, Professor Kaaryn Gustafson, Clinical Professor Meredith Ross,
Assistant Professor Cecelia Klingele, and fellow Hastie Michael Oeser. I would also like to thank
Professor Howie Erlanger, Professor David Schwartz, Karen DeMeola, Jane Sampeur, and Professor
Thomas Mitchell. Thanks to my family for always believing in me. In addition, I owe the idea for this
piece to Greater Hartford Legal Aid, Professional Image, J. Silva, and C. Lee. Thank you for the
inspiration.
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violent offenders to re-enter mainstream society. This Article argues
that simply eliminating post-conviction disabilities would be extremely
complex and perhaps not practically or politically feasible.
Moreover, the two existing federal post-conviction remedies—pardons
and judicial expungements—are not designed to, and cannot as a
practical matter, provide systematic relief from post-conviction
disabilities. Using state post-conviction mechanisms as examples, this
Article argues that congressionally sanctioned expungements are an
attractive alternative to relieve non-violent offenders of the effects of
post-conviction disabilities.
I propose that the United States
Sentencing Commission (U.S.S.C.) create a Second Chance Advisory
Group to determine how best to ameliorate the collateral
consequences of federal convictions. With a Second Chance Advisory
group, the U.S.S.C. could be used as a vehicle for researching and
recommending legislative policy initiatives that will effectively slash
incarceration, recidivism, and opportunity costs.

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2003, the United States Federal Government spent $5.5 billion on
federal corrections alone. 1 This represents a 925% increase in direct and
intergovernmental expenditures on federal corrections compared to
1982. 2 From 1982 to 2003, corrections expenditures grew at an average
annual percentage rate of 11.2%, and they continue to swell. 3 A major
contributing factor to the increasing cost of federal corrections is the
historically high rate of criminal recidivism. 4 It is estimated that
approximately 650,000 men and women are released annually from state
and federal penal facilities. 5 Many releasees will eventually return to
prison, either by violating conditions of their release or by committing a
new offense. 6 It is estimated that two-thirds of released prisoners will
1. KRISTEN A. HUGHES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT IN
2003 3 (2006) available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/jeeus03.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. H.R. REP. NO. 110-140, at 2 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 24, 25 (where the
House Report asserts that the “web of obstacles . . . have substantially contributed to the historically
high rate of recidivism . . . .”).
5. Id.
6. MILES D. HARER, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS OFFICE OF RES. & EVALUATION, RECIDIVISM
AMONG FEDERAL PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1987 2 (1994), available at http://www.bop.gov/news/
research_projects/published_reports/recidivism/oreprrecid87.pdf (reporting that the recidivism rate of
the most recent study conducted by Bureau of Prisons releasees in 1997 was 40.8%). See also U.S.
SENTENCING COMM’N, MEASURING RECIDIVISM: THE CRIMINAL HISTORY COMPUTATION OF THE
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commit a new crime within the first three years. 7 This is a price tag that
the United States government cannot afford to pay. 8
Understanding that the collateral consequences of incarceration are
costing Americans billions of dollars annually, federal policymakers are
shifting their focus from imprisonment toward breaking the cycle of
recidivism. 9 Over the past five years, legislative reforms have been
drafted, introduced to Congress, or signed into law. For example,
George W. Bush signed the Second Chance Act into law in April
2008. 10 The legislation’s principal purpose is to put an end to criminal
recidivism by providing federal assistance to various reentry and
alternatives to incarceration programs. 11 In fiscal year 2010, $100
million was appropriated to fund Second Chance Act programs. 12 In
2009, Congressman Charles D. Rangel reintroduced the “Second Chance
for Ex-Offenders Act of 2009” to the 111th Congress, which would
allow individuals charged with a particular classification of federal
crimes to be eligible for a newly created federal expungement. 13 In the
summer of 2009, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws drafted the Uniform Collateral Consequences of
Conviction Act with the purpose of addressing the post-conviction
consequences and legal barriers to reentry faced by thousands of exoffenders each year. 14 While these efforts are an admirable step in the
right direction, they fail to address the core problem: the record and
stigma associated with conviction.
Many states have attempted to ameliorate the effects of postFEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/Recidivism
_General.pdf [hereinafter MEASURING RECIDIVISM]; U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RECIDIVISM AND THE
“FIRST OFFENDER” (2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/Recidivism_FirstOffender.pdf.
7. H.R. REP. NO. 110-140, at 2 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 24, 25.
8. Todd R. Clear & James Austin, Reducing Mass Incarceration: Implications of the Iron Law
of Prison Populations, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 307, 308 (2009).
9. H.R. REP. NO. 110-140 (“‘prison after imprisonment’—a web of obstacles . . . limit their
housing options, employment prospects, access to healthcare, and potential for family reunification.
These obstacles have substantially contributed to the historically high rate of recidivism . . . .”); Second
Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008) (Section 3(a)(1) explicitly states that
one of the purposes of the Act is “to break the cycle of criminal recidivism.”).
10. Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 122 Stat. 657 (2008).
11. See id. § 3(a)(1); see also H.R. REP. NO. 110-140, at 1 (where the House Report provides that
“H.R. 1593, the ‘Second Chance Act of 2007’ is intended to reduce recidivism, increase public safety,
and help State and local governments better address the growing population of ex-offenders”). The
programs are primarily focused on treating substance abuse.
12. Reentry Policy Council, Second Chance Act Appropriations Update, http://reentrypolicy.org/
government_affairs/second_chance_act (last vitised March 21, 2010).
13. The Second Chance For Ex-Offenders Act of 2009, H.R. 1529, 111th Cong.
14. NAT’L CONF. OF COMM’RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, THE UNIFORM COLLATERAL
CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT (2009), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/
ucsada/2009am_approved.pdf.
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conviction penalties on their releasees, but the federal government’s
efforts have been delayed to say the least. Many states have enacted
some type of executive, legislative, or judicial mechanism that permits
the use of post-conviction remedies to soften the severity of collateral
consequences that result from a felony conviction. Fourteen states
utilize the governor’s pardoning power to expunge any record of
conviction. 15 Seventeen states have first-offender statutes permitting
expungement or authorizing the sealing of first and minor offenses. 16
And thirty-two states and the District of Columbia allow judicial setasides or deferred adjudication for convictions after successful
completion of a sentence, including probationary sentences or a specific
waiting period. 17 In contrast, federal law offers expungement for first
time offenders on one criminal offense: simple possession of narcotics. 18
Part II of this Article presents a broad overview of recidivism and the
effect of collateral consequences on ex-offenders. While the focus of
the Article is on the federal offender and the federal system, it is
important to discuss state implications of a felony offender as well. 19
Part II demonstrates that America is forced to pay a variety of economic
and political costs in exchange for the enactment and enforcement of
collateral consequences. Part III reviews the remedies currently
available to federal offenders, including presidential pardons and
judicial petitions for expungement. The two existing federal postconviction remedies are not designed to, and cannot as a practical
matter, provide systematic relief from post-conviction disabilities. Part
IV examines the expungement programs in Massachusetts, California,
and Connecticut. This Part examines the different state methods used to
15. MARGARET COLGATE LOVE, RELIEF FROM THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF A
CRIMINAL CONVICTION: A STATE-BY-STATE RESOURCE GUIDE tbl.5 (2009) (These states include
Arkansas, Connecticut, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Washington, and West Virginia.).
16. Id. (These states include Arkansas, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan,
Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South
Dakota, and Utah.).
17. Id. (These states include Arizona, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Vermont, Washington, and
Wyoming.).
18. The Federal First Offender Act, 18 U.S.C § 3607(c) (2006) (providing for the expungement
of disposition records for individuals found guilty of simple narcotic possession (21 U.S.C. § 844) with
no prior convictions).
19. The state in which the federal offender returns is likely to have in place its own state statutes
and regulations imposing collateral consequences on ex-offenders. Moreover, state remedies are
typically not available to the federal offender due to federalism concerns. These features compound
reentry efforts of the federal offender making him unique.
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reintegrate state offenders back into mainstream society. Part V
discusses an approach in which a comprehensive federal legislative plan
for expungement can be crafted and executed—a mechanism for
obtaining a clean slate. This Article advocates for the creation of a
Second Chance Advisory Group to the United States Sentencing
Commission. This group would be charged with investigating criminal
recidivism, collateral consequences, and the costs associated with both.
After adequately examining these issues, this group would be charged
with recommending legislative initiatives to resolve these concerns
including the creation of a comprehensive federal expungement program
for non-violent federal offenders.
II. POST-CONVICTION PENALTIES AND RECIDIVISM
Post-conviction penalties involve a web of political, social, and
economic obstacles faced by ex-offenders. 20 They are numerous and
potent. These consequences take the form of mandatory exclusions and
restrictions that operate outside of the public view and beyond the
normal sentencing framework. 21 Reentry scholar Jeremy Travis called
this phenomenon the “invisible punishment.” 22 This punishment begins
the day the ex-offender is released and often results in a return to prison
shortly thereafter. 23
A. Definitions
As a starting point, it is important to be clear on how terms are
defined in this Article. For purposes of this Article, recidivism is
defined in accordance with the U.S.S.C.’s understanding. 24 Recidivism
consists of one of the following: (1) re-conviction of a new offense or
(2) revocation of probation/parole. 25 For purposes of this Article, an
expungement is defined as the removal of the record of criminal
conviction and related documents from public purview and general
public accessibility. Expungement would not, however, destroy law
enforcement accessibility. Maintaining such records for an extended
period of time is in the interest of public safety. The understanding of
20. H.R. REP. NO. 110-140, at 2 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 24, 25.
21. Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 15–19 (Marc Mauer &
Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).
22. Id.
23. H.R. REP NO. 110-140.
24. MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 6, at 4.
25. Id. The U.S.S.C. also considers re-arrest a component of the definition of “recidivism.”
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the legal effect of an expungement is taken from the Federal First
Offender Act and is adopted for purposes of this Article:
The effect of the order shall be to restore such person, in the
contemplation of the law, to the status he occupied before such arrest or
institution of criminal proceedings. A person concerning whom such an
order has been entered shall not be held thereafter under any provision of
law to be guilty of perjury, false swearing, or making a false statement by
reason of his failure to recite or acknowledge such arrests or institution of
criminal proceedings, or the results thereof, in response to an inquiry
made of him for any purpose. 26

It is important to understand that this Article only focuses on the nonviolent federal offender. The additional restrictions and special
conditions on violent offenders and immigrant populations are beyond
the scope of this Article. 27 The definition of non-violent is the inverse
definition of “violent” taken from the Armed Career Criminal Act (the
Act). 28 The Act was chosen due to the guidance it offers regarding
Congress’s potential stance on legal elements that define non-violent
offenders. Thus, a non-violent offender is defined as an individual, who
has been convicted of a crime that does not have an element requiring
“the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person . . . of another.” 29 For purposes of this Article, those convicted
of drug trafficking/possession and property crimes are included in this
class of offenders. At last count federal prisoners convicted of drug
offenses comprised 53.5% of the prison population. 30 Finally, the term
collateral consequence is defined as a statutory and/or regulatory
disqualification occurring in both the public and private sectors resulting
from a criminal conviction.

26. The Federal First Offender Act, 18 U.S.C § 3607(c) (2006).
27. It is important to note that I also advocate for this system for the violent offender however,
the concerns and restrictions regarding that sub-group are beyond the scope of this paper. I also
recognize that there are numerous immigration implications on this topic but they too are beyond the
scope of this paper.
28. Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (2006). The ACCA defines
“violent felony” as a “crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” and either “(i)
has an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another;
or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves the use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” See also Chambers v. United States, 129
S.Ct. 687 (2009); Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
29. § 924(e)(2)(B).
30. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE OF THE BUREAU 2007 52,
available at http://www.bop.gov/news/PDFs/sob07.pdf.
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B. Recidivism
Recidivism is problematic and expensive. Republican Representative
Frank Wolf stated that members of Congress are “deeply concerned
about the recidivism crisis that is straining our corrections system at all
levels.” 31 After decades of mandatory minimums, “truth” in sentencing
and the abolition of parole, the federal government is taking steps
toward reforming the way America punishes. There seems to be a
growing sense that “the revolving door” in and out of prison results in
the breakdown of families, collapse of local economies, and destruction
of entire communities.
The last formal recidivism study tracking a cohort of federal prisoners
was conducted by the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) in 1987 and
published in 1994. 32 This will be referred to as the “Harer study,” and it
is the most recent research focusing squarely on federal offender
recidivism over a three year period. 33 Recent state recidivism studies
conducted in the past few years are comparable with the results of the
Harer study. 34
The Harer study was based on a representative sample of 1,205 BOP
inmates. 35 It found that within the first three years of their release,
40.8% of the former inmates had recidivated. 36 The rates were highest
31. Congressional Leaders Take on Recidivism and Corrections Spending, NAT’L REENTRY RES.
CTR., Jan. 28, 2010, available at http://www.nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/announcements/
congressional-leaders-take-on-recidivism-and-corrections-spending (last visited March 21, 2010).
32. HARER, supra note 6.
33. This information was verified through a phone conversation with the BOP Office of
Research on February 21, 2010. More recent federal recidivism studies conducted by the U.S.S.C. in
2003 have focused on first-time federal offenders and recidivism in relation to the accuracy of the
Criminal History Category.
34. CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY & PLANNING DIV. UNIT, CONN. OFFICE OF POLICY MGMT., 2010
ANNUAL RECIDIVISM REPORT (2010) [hereinafter CONN. OPM 2010 STUDY]; CRIMINAL JUSTICE
POLICY & PLANNING DIV. UNIT, CONN. OFFICE OF POLICY MGMT., 2009 CONNECTICUT RECIDIVISM
STUDY (2009) [hereinafter CONN. OPM 2009 STUDY]; HOLLIE MATTHEWS & CHRISTOPHER CALIA,
MASS. DEP’T OF CORR., RECIDIVISM OF 2002 RELEASED DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION INMATES (MAY
2009) [hereinafter MASS. 2009 STUDY]; STEVEN J. SEMMANN, WIS. SENTENCING COMM’N, THREE
CRITICAL SENTENCING ELEMENTS REDUCE RECIDIVISM: A COMPARISON BETWEEN ROBBERS AND
OTHER OFFENDERS, (2006) [hereinafter WIS. 2006 STUDY]; ARIZ. DEP’T OF CORR., ARIZONA INMATE
RECIDIVISM STUDY, (2005), available at http://www.adc.state.az.us/adc/reports/recidivism_2005.pdf;
NANCY G. LA VIGNE & CYNTHIA A. MAMALIAN, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., PRISONER
REENTRY IN GEORGIA, (2004) [hereinafter GA. 2000 STUDY]; FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS RECIDIVISM REPORT: INMATES RELEASED FROM FLORIDA PRISONS
JULY 1995 TO JUNE 2001 (2003).
35. HARER, supra note 6, at 1.
36. Id.
Cf. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism, http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/
index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17 (last visited March 16, 2010) (reporting that the recidivism rate for 300,000
prisoners released in 1994 in fifteen states was 67.5%); CONN. OPM 2010 STUDY, supra note 34, at 4
(stating that recidivism rate for 2005 cohort that was returned to prison with new charges for either a
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within the first year of release with a rate of 20.3%. 37 In the first six
months of release 11.3% of the sample recidivated. 38 An additional
11.4% of new releasees recidivated in year two and 9.1% in year three. 39
The study documented the monthly recidivism rate over a thirty-six
month period and found that the rate dropped from twenty-nine per one
thousand individuals recidivating in the first month to two per one
thousand individuals recidivating in the thirty-sixth month. 40 Thus,
there is a downhill slope from month one to month thirty-six signifying
a decrease in the risk of recidivism as time passes. 41
Post-release employment appears to be a, if not the, determinative
factor in post-release success. The majority of offenses, both primary
incarcerating and recidividating, consist of economic crimes such as
drug trafficking, theft, larceny, etc., which suggests that many crimes are
committed with an economic objective—getting paid. 42 In the Harer
study ex-offenders, who arranged for post-release employment, had a
recidivism rate of 27.6% compared to 53.9% of those who did not. 43 In
other words, post-release employment appears to cut the recidivism rate
by almost half.
Moreover, the Harer study concluded that those offenders released to
a halfway house prior to being released back to the community were
more successful than those directly released to the community because
the halfway house increases the likelihood of obtaining post-release
employment. 44 Of the 614 people in the sample who went to halfway
supervision violation or to begin a new prison sentence was 56.5%); CONN. OPM 2009 STUDY, supra
note 34, at 10 (stating that recidivism rate for 2004 cohort that was returned to prison at least once in the
three year study was 56%); WIS. 2006 STUDY, supra note 34, at 1 (stating that recidivism rates vary
from 39% to 58% depending on the number of prior offenses); MASS. 2009 STUDY, supra note 34, at v
(reporting recidivism rate for 2002 cohort at 40%); GA. 2000 STUDY, supra note 34, at 18 (reporting
recidivism rate for 2000 cohort at 36%).
37. HARER, supra note 6, at 2. Cf. CONN OPM 2010 study, supra note 34, app. at 3 (stating the
recidivism rate for 2005 cohort that was returned to prison within twelve months was 34.2%); MASS.
2009 STUDY, supra note 34, at v (reporting recidivism rate within the first eighteen months for 2002
cohort at 28%).
38. HARER, supra note 6, at 2.
39. Id. at 9.
40. Id.
41. Id. State studies also show a downhill slope from month one to month thirty-six. See
RHIANA KOHL ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., MASSACHUSETTS RECIDIVISM STUDY: A
CLOSER LOOK AT RELEASES AND RETURNS TO PRISON 22 (2008) (showing a decrease in recidivism
from month one at 18% compared with month thirty-six at 9%); CONN. OPM 2010 STUDY, supra note
34, app. at 3 (demonstrating a downhill slope of recidivism (returning to prison) in month one with five
hundred nine returnees compared with month thirty-six with eighty returnees).
42. HARER, supra note 6, at 52.
43. Id. at 4–5. See MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 6, at 12.
44. HARER, supra note 6, at 63–66; CHRISTY VISHER ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR.,
EMPLOYMENT AFTER PRISON: A LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF RELEASEES IN THREE STATES 1 (2008),
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houses, 68.1% obtained employment compared to 22% of those released
directly to the community. 45 This disparity is largely due to halfway
house selection where individuals are selected due to their
employability. 46 Thus, halfway house release has an indirect positive
effect on reentry through the opportunity of employment. Therefore, it
comes as no surprise that post-release employment has a positive effect
on reducing recidivism.
Education also seems to play an important role in success. The Harer
study demonstrated that recidivism is inversely related to education
level. Those offenders entering prison with an education of eighth grade
or less who participated in Adult Basic Education and GED courses had
a lower recidivism rate than those who opted out.47 The same is true of
those entering prison with some high school education and participating
in Adult Continuing Education, Post-Secondary Education, and Adult
Basic Education. 48 Family and spousal support appears just as
determinative with those releasees living with a spouse post-release
recidivating at a rate of 20.0% while those with other living
arrangements recidivating at a rate of 47.9%. 49
There is no classic textbook profile for a typical recidivist. One must
piece together a picture from the sparse statistical evidence available on
BOP recidivism. The highest recidivism rate, at 64%, was among those
in prison for robbery or other crimes against a person, excluding sex
offenses, manslaughter, and homicide. 50 Drug trafficking and fraud had
the lowest recidivism rates at 34.2% and 20.8% respectively. 51 The
largest number of recidivating events were arrests for drug trafficking or
possession followed by larceny and parole violations. 52 Males and
females recidivated at almost the same rate with 40.9% of men

available at http://www.urban.org/publications/411778.html.
45. HARER, supra note 6, at 63.
46. Id. at 64.
47. Id. at 23–25.
48. Id. at 4–5. See MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 6, at 12 (showing that while education
correlates with lower levels of recidivism, there is an exception for recidivism rates for offenders with
college educations. This group tends to have a higher rate or recidivism than other educated groups.).
49. HARER, supra note 6, at 5. Cf. CHRISTY VISHER ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR.,
THE IMPACT OF MARITAL AND RELATIONSHIP STATUS ON SOCIAL OUTCOMES FOR RETURNING
PRISONERS 6 (2009), available at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411778_employment_after_
prison.pdf.
50. See HARER, supra note 6, at 3; WIS. 2006 STUDY, supra note 34, at 1 (stating that convicted
robbers recidivate at a higher rate, 65%, compared with most other offenders at a rate of 35%).
51. See HARER, supra note 6, at 3.
52. See id. at 6 (The recidivating events broke down as follows: 25.3% for drug trafficking or
possession; 13.1% for larceny theft, 13.1% for parole violations, and 6.9% for assault.).
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recidivating compared with 39.7% of women. 53 Recidivism rates were
highest among African-Americans with 58.8% of releasees recidivating
followed by Hispanics at 45.2% and Whites at 33.5%. 54 Those with a
history of drug or alcohol abuse were more likely to recidivate than
those without such history. 55 Older ex-offenders were less likely to
return to prison with a rate of recidivism of 15.3% for individuals fiftyfive years of age or older compared to a 56.6% rate for persons twentyfive years and younger. 56 People with more schooling were less likely
to return to prison as well those employed full time prior to the federal
offense. 57
From the available data, it can be determined that employment is
critical to the success of a new releasee. Education and family support
are also key factors in a smooth transition from prison to the community.
The collateral consequences outlined in the next section serve as major
roadblocks to economic opportunity, access to education, and family
reunification. These collateral consequences undermine the very factors
that have been shown to decrease recidivism and increase public safety.
An expungement program could reduce the consequences discussed in
detail in the next section.
C. Collateral Consequences and the Loss of Opportunity
Something as simple as checking a box indicating a conviction bars a
person from employment, housing, educational assistance, and
government benefits. Collateral consequences take the form of
employment disqualifications in the public and private sectors,
prohibitions on federal educational subsidies, housing exclusions, public
benefit ineligibility, and political punishment. 58 They are commonly
justified on preventative grounds. 59 The consequences are thought to
deter ex-offenders from committing new crimes while also protecting

53. Id.
54. See id. at 2.
55. See id. at 4 (Heroin abusers had the highest rate of recidivism with a rate of 69.5%, while
powder cocaine users had the lowest rate of recidivism at 51.3%.).
56. See id. at 3; MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 6, at 12.
57. HARER, supra note 6, at 3.
58. Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry and the Collateral
Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585, 594–
99 (2006); Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller, Collateral Civil Penalties as Techniques of Social
Policy, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, 19–20 (Christopher Mele & Teresa A. Miller
eds., 2005); Travis, supra note 21, at 22–23.
59. Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 160 (1999).
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the public from the criminal’s influence. 60 On another level they are
considered to provide a denunciatory purpose and retributive function. 61
These theoretical justifications do less to serve the stated objectives and
more to provide a strong argument for the designation of collateral
consequences as part of the sentencing court’s punishment for the
original offense. 62 This web of obstacles significantly contributes to the
current recidivism rate. 63 Moreover, the ex-offender faces a double
penalty: he pays his debt through incarceration and also pays through
loss of opportunity. This opportunity cost is socioeconomic, political,
and seemingly never ending.
1. Employment as a “Rehabilitative Necessity”
So strong is the inverse correlation between employment and recidivism
that employment is considered a “rehabilitative necessity.” 64

Employment is intrinsic to the American identity. Maintaining
employment is not only a prerequisite to membership in society but is
also a staple to the survival of the American family. Without
employment, one is stripped of the ability to provide for himself or his
family. An individual who does not participate in the labor market is not
only economically disadvantaged but is also socially marred. 65
Joblessness is a primary factor in recidivism and also one of the most
severe post-conviction penalties. 66 Many ex-offenders released from
prison face this obstacle head-on and are repeatedly rejected, denied, and
virtually excluded from the qualified applicant pool based solely on their
previous conviction.
Stepping out of prison, ex-offenders have fewer employment
opportunities and a decreased lifetime earning potential. 67 It is

60. Id. at 161; Marlaina Freisthler & Mark A. Godsey, Going Home to Stay: A Review of
Collateral Consequences of Conviction, Post-Incarceration Employment, and Recidivism in Ohio, 36 U.
TOL. L. REV. 525, 529 (2005).
61. Demleitner, supra note 59, at 160.
62. Id.
63. H.R. REP. NO. 110-140, at 2 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 24, 25.
64. Freisthler & Godsey, supra note 60, at 532; Jennifer Leavitt, Note, Walking a Tightrope:
Balancing Competing Public Interests in the Employment of Criminal Offenders, 34 CONN. L. REV.
1281, 1286 (2002).
65. See Freisthler & Godsey, supra note 60, at 532.
66. Id.; Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten
Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1719 (2003).
67. Jeremy Travis et al., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., FROM PRISON TO HOME: THE
DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 32 (2001), available at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/from_prison_to_home.pdf.
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estimated that the “wage penalty” of imprisonment is between 10% and
20%. 68 This result is not only attributable to the lack of skills and work
experience that characterize the typical profile of many ex-offenders, it
is also due to the stigmatization and legal employment restrictions that
ex-offenders face. 69
As evidence of its commitment to the “tough on crime” stance in the
1980s, the federal government and several states, implemented a number
of occupational restrictions affecting ex-offenders. 70 These restrictions
have assumed the form of blanket prohibitions based on an individual’s
status as a convicted felon. 71 Unless an exception is made, individuals
convicted of a felony are deemed ineligible to serve in any of the United
States armed forces. 72 Federal law enforcement officers convicted of
felonies will be removed from service. 73 And while the United States
Constitution does not prohibit felons from holding public office, 74
various federal statutes provide for the removal of the individual from
office upon conviction. 75
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Pinard & Thompson, supra note 58, at 596. See also Deborah N. Archer & Kele S.
Williams, Making America “The Land of Second Chances”: Restoring Socioeconomic Rights for ExOffenders, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 527, 532–38 (2006) (discussing state employment
restrictions).
71. See Pinard & Thompson, supra note 58, at 596.
72. 10 U.S.C. § 504 (2006). See also 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(m) (2006).
73. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7371, 8331(20) (2006). “‘Law enforcement officer’ means an employee, the
duties of whose position are primarily the investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals
suspected or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws of the United States, including an employee
engaged in this activity who is transferred to a supervisory or administrative position.” § 8331(20).
“Law enforcement officer” also means:
(A) an employee, the duties of whose position—
(i) are primarily—
(I) the investigation, apprehension, or detention of individuals suspected
or convicted of offenses against the criminal laws of the United States, or
(II) the protection of officials of the United States against threats to
personal safety; and
(ii) are sufficiently rigorous that employment opportunities should be limited to
young and physically vigorous individuals, as determined by the Director
considering the recommendations of the employing agency.
5 U.S.C. § 8401(17) (2006).
74. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3; Id. art. II, § 1; Id. art. VI, cl. 3. The Constitution provides that the
“President, Vice President, and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on
Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” Id.
art. II, § 4.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006) (providing that a conviction of treason bars an individual from
“holding any office under the United States”); 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2006) (providing that bribing a
public official or accepting a bribe disqualifies an individual may be disqualified from holding federal
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In addition, federal law bars certain classes of felons from working in
institutions that are Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
insured 76 and from working in the insurance industry without permission
from an insurance regulatory official. 77 Certain classes of felons are
federally barred for a minimum of thirteen years after conviction from
holding positions in a labor union or other organization that manages
employee benefit plans. 78 A federal statute disqualifies certain exoffenders from providing healthcare services where they will receive
monies from Medicare. 79
Federal and state laws further decrease ex-offenders’ employment
opportunities through occupational licensing laws.
Licensing
restrictions result in the loss of new employment and act as a bar on
reemployment in the occupation in which the offender was employed
prior to conviction. 80 Federal law provides for the suspension and
revocation of numerous licenses including commercial motor vehicle
operator licenses, 81 pilot’s licenses (called airmen certificates), 82
hazardous materials equipment licenses (from local trash collectors to
interstate trucking companies carrying nuclear waste), 83 broadcasting
licenses, 84 and port workers transportation worker identification
credential. 85 This list is by no means exhaustive.
Other federal and state license restrictions have been put forth as
necessary “to foster high professional standards,” while limitations on
employment opportunities are said to guarantee that those hired have
“good moral character.” 86 Suspensions and revocations placed on the
licenses of commodity dealers, 87 customs brokers, 88 and SEC registrants

office); 5 U.S.C. § 7313 (2006) (removes from federal or District of Columbia office and also
disqualifies from employment in the United States or the District of Columbia for five years upon
conviction of inciting, organizing, encouraging, or participating in, a riot or civil disorder or any offense
committed in furtherance of, or while participating in, a riot or civil disorder).
76. 12 U.S.C. § 1829 (2006).
77. 18 U.S.C. § 1033(e)(1)(A), (2) (2006).
78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 504, 1111 (2006).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (2006).
80. Anthony C. Thompson, Navigating the Hidden Obstacles to Ex-Offender Reentry, 45 B.C. L.
REV. 225, 282 (2004).
81. 49 U.S.C. § 31310 (2006) (provides for a one time reinstatement for some offenses after ten
years).
82. 49 U.S.C. § 44710 (2006); 14 C.F.R. § 61.15 (2010).
83. 49 U.S.C. § 5103a (2006).
84. 47 C.F.R. § 73.4280 (2010).
85. 46 U.S.C. § 70105 (2006), 49 C.F.R. §§ 1515.7, 1572.103 (2010).
86. Demleitner, supra note 59, at 156.
87. 7 U.S.C. § 12a(2) (2006).
88. 19 U.S.C. § 1641 (2006).
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(brokers and dealers) 89 are examples where “good moral character”
comes into play. In all of the above mentioned statutes and regulations,
criminal background checks are conducted and a conviction becomes a
statutory basis for denial. Thus, if a new releasee convicted of drug
possession wanted to return to work as the local trash collector, he
would be prevented from doing so as his license was revoked upon
conviction.
One of the most common problems associated with access to work is
the employer’s unwillingness to hire an individual with a criminal
conviction. Various studies conducted over the past fifteen years
consistently show that on average 60% of employers indicate that they
would “probably not” or “definitely not” consider hiring an individual
with a criminal history. 90 A study conducted by Devah Pager in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin suggests that a criminal record reduces the
likelihood of a callback by 50% depending on the race of the
applicant. 91 Overall reasons given for the automatic exclusion of exoffenders from the applicant pool include fears of theft, issues of
physical safety, desire to avoid dealing with probation officers, and the
risk of the employee reoffending. 92 Employers note a distinction
between non-violent and violent offenders and assert that such a
difference is an important element in their decision. 93 Inducements,

89. 15 U.S.C. 78o (2006).
90. DEVAH PAGER & BRUCE WESTERN, INVESTIGATING PRISONER REENTRY: THE IMPACT OF
CONVICTION STATUS ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS OF YOUNG MEN 20 (2009) (The study was
conducted in New York City. The study was an employment audit conducted with four male testers:
two African-Americans and two whites. The testers were paired by race; the two African-American
testers formed one team and the two white testers formed the second team. Within each team, one
auditor was randomly assigned a “criminal record” for the first week; the pair rotated which member
presented himself as the ex-offender for each successive week of employment searches, such that the
tester served in the criminal record condition for an equal number of cases. The criminal record
consisted of a felony drug conviction (possession with intent to distribute cocaine) and eighteen months
of served prison time. The testers were to apply for real job openings in entry level positions to see
whether employers respond differently to applications on the basis of selected characteristics. The audit
was subsequently followed by a telephone survey to employers for the investigative purposes.); Devah
Pager & Lincoln Quillian, Walking the Talk? What Employers Say Versus What They Do, 70 AM. SOC.
REV. 355, 363 (2005). See also Devah Pager et al., Discrimination in a Low-Wage Labor Market: A
Field Experiment, 74 AM. SOC. REV. 777, 363 (2005); Harry J. Holzer et al., Will Employers Hire ExOffenders? Employer Preferences, Background Checks and Their Determinants, in IMPRISONING
AMERICA: THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF MASS INCARCERATION 205 (Mary Patillo et al. eds., 2001) (The
study was an employer survey conducted in 1993–1994 in four cities: Boston, Atlanta, Detroit, and Los
Angeles finding exclusion rates of 60%.).
91. Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 WIS. L. REV. 617 (2005) (The callback
rate was 34% for whites with no criminal record, 17% for whites with a criminal record, 14% for
African-Americans without a criminal record, and 5% for African-Americans with a criminal record.).
92. PAGER & WESTERN, supra note 90, at 23.
93. Id.
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such as tax incentives and federal bonding, play a positive role in the
hiring of releasees. 94 Surprisingly, negligent hiring liability is not the
primary concern for employers when deciding whether to hire an exoffender. 95 A study published in 2009 found that the majority of
employers are more concerned about behavioral problems than anything
else. 96
This “employment penalty” has developed into a major
socioeconomic problem for entire communities. Social organizations
and advocacy groups across the country have been working with their
municipal and state legislatures to “Ban the Box” on employment
applications for work in public sector positions. 97 Major cities, such as
Boston and Chicago, have enacted rules requiring city employers to
review an applicant’s qualifications prior to conducting a background
check. 98 Entire states are following suit with similar legislation in
Illinois and Kansas. 99
2. Disqualification from Federal Educational Assistance
Under the Higher Education Amendments of 1998, individuals with
minor drug convictions while receiving federal aid will be deemed
The
ineligible for continued federal educational assistance. 100
amendments state that individuals convicted of drug-related offenses,
state or federal, are disqualified from receiving federal student loans,
grants or work study for varying time periods depending on the nature
and number of convictions. 101 For example, an individual convicted of
first time possession of a controlled substance is ineligible to receive
federal student assistance for one year from the date of conviction. 102 A
person convicted of a second offense for possession faces ineligibility

94. Id. at 29.
95. Id. at 28.
96. Id. at 23.
97. Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, Ban the Box, http://www.allofusornone.org/
campaigns/ban-the-box (last visited February 21, 2010) (Ban the Box is a national initiative aimed at
prohibiting city and/or state employers from requesting information pertaining to criminal convictions
on initial employment applications.).
98. SAFER FOUNDATIONS, RECENT LEGISLATION ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR HIRING
PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS, available at http://www.saferfoundation.org/docs/Hiring_Standards_
Matrix_Final_(2).pdf (last visited February 21, 2010).
99. Id. See H.R. Res. 107, 94th Leg. (Ill. 2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4710 (2009).
100. Pub. L. No. 105-244, 112 Stat. 1581 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.
(2000)).
101. 20 U.S.C. § 1091(r)(1) (2006).
102. Id.
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for two years, and for a third time—“indefinite” ineligibility. 103 A first
offense of the sale of a controlled substance results in the ineligibility for
two years with a subsequent offense resulting in indefinite
ineligibility. 104 The text of the statute does not link eligibility for receipt
of federal assistance on any other offense, only drug related crimes. 105
State financial aid is typically linked to the federal requirements
adding more exclusions and a layer of complexity. This prevents
thousands of potential students from financing their education. In the
2000–2001 academic year, over 65,000 applicants filing for federal
student assistance indicated they had been convicted of either selling or
possessing a controlled substance while an additional 11,417 applicants
left the question blank. 106
3. Issues in Housing
Criminal convictions, tarnished credit, and sparse employment are all
common issues faced by ex-offenders. They are also justifications for
landlords and property managers to reject otherwise qualified applicants.
A 2007 study examined landlords’ perspectives toward housing released
offenders. 107 The study showed that out of 611 landlord and property
managers who participated in the survey, 66% would not accept an
applicant with a criminal history. 108
Securing public housing is another difficult challenge. Changes in
federal housing policy, particularly in the past fifteen years, have
dramatically affected the ability of ex-offenders to obtain affordable
housing. In the same year Congress overhauled welfare legislation, it
also tightened the rules governing government-backed housing
subsidies. Congress promulgated rules giving housing authorities great
discretionary power to prohibit ex-offenders from securing § 8 vouchers
and apartments in public housing projects. 109 Under the Housing

103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Dan Curry, U.S. May Relax Ban on Aid for Those with Drug Convictions, CHRONICLE OF
HIGHER EDU., Sept. 7, 2001, http://chronicle.com/article/US-May-Relax-Ban-on-Aid-for/20048.
107. Lynn M. Clark, Landlord Attitudes Toward Renting to Released Offender, 71 FED.
PROBATION 20 (2007).
108. Id. at 22.
109. Housing Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-120, 110 Stat. 834
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 and 42 U.S.C. (2006)); Veteran Affairs and Hud
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461 (1998); 42 U.S.C. § 13663(a) (2006); 24
C.F.R. § 960.204(a)(3), (4) (2010).
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Opportunity Program Extension Act of 1996 110 and the Quality Housing
and Work Responsibility Act of 1998, 111 an ex-offender faces a lifetime
ban on receiving § 8 and other federally subsidized housing, if any
member of the household is required to register with the state as a sex
offender or has been convicted of production of methamphetamine on
public housing grounds. 112 Moreover, local housing authorities may
refuse housing to individuals who have “engaged in any drug-related or
violent criminal activity or other activity which would adversely affect
the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by
other residents, the owner, or public housing agency employees” for a
“reasonable time.” 113 Furthermore,
any criminal activity that threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful
enjoyment of the premises by other tenants or any drug-related criminal
activity on or off such premises, engaged in by a public housing tenant,
any member of the tenant’s household, or any guest or other person under
the tenant’s control, shall be cause for termination of tenancy. 114

This language in effect permits housing authorities to evict residents on
the basis of a drug arrest on or off the premises of any individual in the
household. 115 This strict liability punishment for third party actions has
been upheld by the Supreme Court in HUD v. Rucker. 116 These new
regulations typically cause landlords to decline ex-offenders’
applications. 117
These federal policies are severe, resulting in the punishment of entire
family units for the past criminal behaviors of a single member of the
household. Families of formerly imprisoned individuals “find it nearly
impossible” to reunify with their fathers, mothers, and children without

110. Pub. L. No. 104-120, 110 Stat. 834 (1996) (codified as amended in scatter sections of 12 and
42 U.S.C. (2000)).
111. Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2518 (1998).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 13663(a) (2006) (registered sex offenders); 24 C.F.R. § 960.204(a)(3), (4) (2010)
(registered sex offenders and those convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine on the premises of
federally-assisted housing).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 13661(c) (2006); 24 C.F.R. § 906.203(c) (2010) (providing that in screening
applicants, public housing authorities may consider “all relevant information”).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) (2006).
115. Id.
116. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125, 127–28 (2002); Christopher Mele,
The Civil Threat of Eviction, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS
IMPRISONMENT, supra note 21.
117. See Christopher Mele, The Civil Threat of Eviction, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra note 21, at 25. Data is not currently
available on the denial of applicants to Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
administered programs.
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potentially endangering their subsidies. 118 The regulations’ effects are
the fracturing of family units and the penalization of household members
without convictions.
4. Lifetime Ban on TANF and Food Stamps
In 1996, Congress systematically dismantled welfare in the United
States, in effect poking large holes in the socioeconomic safety net for
ex-offenders and the families who rely on them. 119 Through a series of
legislative initiatives, Congress enacted laws that imposed restrictions
based on felony convictions on receipt of cash benefits and food stamps.
These restrictions have a direct and often negative impact on the exoffender and his family. 120
Under the Clinton Administration, the Welfare Reform Act of 1996,
entitled the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), terminated individual entitlements and
replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) with block
grants known as Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). 121
TANF provides cash assistance to needy families to meet life’s basic
requirements while the food stamp program provides low income
families with a way to obtain foodstuffs. 122 The 1996 change provided
that an individual convicted of a federal or state felony offense involving
the use or sale of drugs is subject to a lifetime ban on food stamps and
cash assistance. 123 Thus, a newly released ex-offender is barred from
receiving food and minimal cash assistance at the very moment he
would most need it.
5. Disenfranchisement
Christopher Uggen and Jeff Manza estimate that approximately 4.7
million adults were legally disenfranchised by virtue of conviction in
118. Gwen Rubinstein & Debbie Mukamal, Welfare and Housing—Denial of Benefits to Drug
Offenders, in INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT,
supra note 21, at 37, 48.
119. PATRICIA ALLARD, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE SENTENCES: DENYING WELFARE
BENEFITS TO WOMEN CONVICTED OF DRUG OFFENSES 10–14 (2002), available at
http://www.soros.org/initiatives/baltimore/articles_publications/publications/lifesentences/03-1803atriciaAllardReport.pdf; Archer & Williams, supra note 70, at 541.
120. Demleitner, supra note 59, at 158.
121. Travis, supra note 21, at 23.
122. Archer & Williams, supra note 70, at 542.
123. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 8, 21, 25, and 42 U.S.C., § 115(a)
(2006); codified at 21 U.S.C. § 862a(a) (2006)).
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2000. 124 Three-fourths of this population were either under community
supervision or had completed their sentence but were still
disenfranchised by state statute. 125
Individuals charged with
misdemeanor crimes currently incarcerated and awaiting trial are also
“practically disenfranchised” in that they retain the legal right to vote
but are denied access to the polls on Election Day. 126 This phenomenon
impacts racial minorities more severely. One study estimated that 13%
of African-American males are disenfranchised due to a felony
conviction and that in 2000 over 10% of the African-American voting
population was disenfranchised in fifteen states. 127 Disenfranchised
felons comprise more than 2% of the voting age population and four of
the last eleven presidential elections were won by a 1.1% margin of
victory. 128 Felon disenfranchisement may be more salient, and perhaps
a decisive, factor in future presidential races. 129
Constitutional challenges to felon disenfranchisement have been
unsuccessful following the Supreme Court’s decision in Richardson v.
Ramirez. 130
In Richardson, the Court ruled that felon
disenfranchisement is not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. 131 It reasoned that § 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment appears to explicitly allow limitations on voting due to a
criminal conviction. 132
The constitutional text calls for
disenfranchisement for participation “in rebellion or other crimes.” 133
However, a recent circuit challenge, decided in 2008, seems to have
reignited the debate by focusing on the statutory requirements of the
Voting Rights Act. 134 In Farrakhan v. Gregoire, the Ninth Circuit ruled
124. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Disenfranchisement and the Civic Reintegration of
Convicted Felons, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 21, at 67 (They predicted
that the Democrats would have gained parity in the U.S. Senate in 1984 and would have maintained
control of the Senate from 1986 to the present. Furthermore, they predicted that had the rate of felon
disenfranchisement been the same as it is today during 1960, John F. Kennedy’s election would have
been jeopardized.). See also Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Democratic Contraction? Political
Consequences of Felon Disenfranchisement in the United States, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 777 (2002); Brian
Pinaire et al., Barred From the Vote: Public Attitudes Toward the Disenfranchisement of Felons, 30
FORDHAM URB. L. J. 1519 (2003).
125. Christopher Uggen & Jeff Manza, Disenfranchisement and the Civic Reintegration of
Convicted Felons, in CIVIL PENALTIES, SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES, supra note 21, at 71.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 72.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1976).
131. Id. at 56.
132. Id.
133. Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
134. Farrakhan v. Gregoire, 590 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2010).
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that the state of Washington’s felon disenfranchisement law violated § 2
of the Voting Rights Act. 135 It has been considered a small victory for
ex-offenders and advocates on the voting disenfranchisement front.
While it is clear that further research is needed to connect civic
reintegration with a reduction in recidivism, a great deal has already
been done to make a case for abandoning statutes barring ex-offenders
from participating in the political process. In 2001, the National
Commission on Federal Election Reform, headed by Jimmy Carter and
Gerald Ford, advocated for the restoration of voting rights to exoffenders who had fully completed their sentences. 136
D. Summary
Today, in America, a felony conviction costs. It costs taxpayers in
the form of expenditures supporting various penal departments. It costs
the ex-offender socioeconomic and political opportunity. It also costs
American society in the form of human capital and progression,
individual talent, and community strength. The picture created from the
recidivism research conducted by the BOP shows that employment is
vital to the success of the releasee. Yet, most employers are unlikely to
hire an individual with a criminal record. The research also shows that
education and family support play key roles in keeping an ex-offender
out of prison. However, the federal government will not provide
educational assistance to individuals convicted of drug offenses and exoffenders’ inability to obtain housing keeps families apart. The cycle
perpetuates itself causing desperation, reoffending, and ultimately a
return to prison.
Federal offenders are in a particularly precarious position as they have
no realistic remedy available to them to combat these obstacles.
Presidential pardons are merely symbolic and judicial petitions for
expungement are almost non-existent. Congress is the only branch of
government that has the authority to create a system with the
wherewithal to break the cycle that it in essence created.
III. POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
This Part describes the two existing post-conviction remedies in the
135. Id. at 1016 (The court further found that Plaintiffs met their summary judgment burden of
proving that the discriminatory impact of the disenfranchisement law was attributable to racial
discrimination in the Washington criminal justice system.).
136. NAT’L COMM’N ON FED. ELECTION REFORM, TO ASSURE PRIDE AND CONFIDENCE IN THE
ELECTORAL PROCESS (2001).
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federal system—the presidential pardoning power and federal judicial
expungements—and shows why both are inadequate to address the
numerous collateral consequences faced by today’s federal ex-offender.
It is unclear whether the pardoning power could constitutionally
expunge a criminal conviction. It is also uncertain whether federal
courts have the requisite jurisdiction to hear petitions for expungements.
The federal circuits remain divided on the issue. Congress is the only
branch of government with the authority to implement a viable federal
program aimed at combating collateral consequences.
A. Presidential Pardon
The President shall . . . have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for
Offenses against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment. 137

The power to pardon is one of the greatest and most unbridled powers
enumerated in the text of the United States Constitution. There are no
constitutional textual restrictions and neither of the two other branches
may check the President in the use of this power. 138 The power itself is
also regarded as one of the most benevolent powers of our chief
executive, bestowing mercy and forgiveness on those to whom it is
granted. 139 Actual utilization of the power speaks to the American
tradition of separation of powers as well as checks and balances. While
pardons were not designed to achieve any sort of systematic criminal
justice reform, they do serve as a check on the other two branches of
government by flagging harsh and inflexible criminal statutes and by
challenging outcomes of criminal cases. 140 Despite the enormous
authority conferred upon the President, the pardoning power has become
increasingly underutilized, particularly in recent years.

137. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
138. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833) (asserting that the power to
pardon is the private and official act of the President); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380
(1866) (asserting that the presidential pardoning power is not subject to legislative controls).
139. Wilson, 32 U.S. at 159–60 (“A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed, from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed”); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 311
(1855) (stating that a pardon is “forgiveness, release, remission”). See also William F. Duker, The
President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475 (1977); Daniel T.
Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power from the King, 69 TEX. L. REV.
569 (1991).
140. Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics, and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the
President’s Duty To Be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1506–08 (2000).
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1. Origins
The earliest account of pardons is found in the ancient Greek citystate of Athens. 141 Although not highly developed, pardons existed.
However, in Athens the power rested with the people. 142 The process
was quite difficult and typically depended on popularity rather than
concerns of justice or mercy. 143
The power to pardon eventually manifested itself in England; first in
the English Crown and ultimately in the hands of Parliament. 144 In
England, pardons were the exclusive legal remedy of justice for those
individuals whose punishment was questionable due to infancy,
incapacity, etc. 145 Pardons were also used as a tool of conscription, by
which the King would pardon outlaws in exchange for service in the
royal military. 146 In 1535, King Henry VIII consolidated the power to
pardon in the Crown. 147 This power was absolute and remained so for
165 years until a constitutional crisis forced the English to rethink the
authority given to the King. 148
England began its colonization of North America in 1585. American
Colonists of the new world took with them English ideas, laws, and
systems of governance. This included the clemency power, which the
King delegated to his direct representatives in the New World. 149 The
royal charters for each of the colonies expressly committed the power to
pardon to the executive of each colony. 150 However, the American
Revolution brought with it distrust of executive authority as well as an
end to executive clemency. 151 With this, most states placed the
authority in the hands of the legislature. 152
141. Kobil, supra note 139, at 583.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 584 (An individual petitioning for a pardon was required to obtain the support of 6,000
citizens in a secret poll. Those individuals who were not athletes or celebrities had incredible difficulty
obtaining such support).
144. Id. at 586; Duker, supra note 139, at 475–87.
145. Duker, supra note 139, at 479 (describing the case of four-year-old Katherine Pesscavant
who was imprisoned in the abbot of St. Alban’s gaol because she unintentionally killed a younger child
by opening a door and accidentally pushing him into a cauldron of hot water).
146. Id. at 478.
147. Kobil, supra note 139, at 586; Duker, supra note 139, at 493.
148. Duker, supra note 139, at 487.
149. Kobil, supra note 139, at 589.
150. Id. (The charters of Virginia, Massachusetts Bay, Maine, Maryland, Georgia, Pennsylvania,
the Carolinas and New Jersey gave the power directly to the governors. Rhode Island, Connecticut, and
Providence gave the power to the legislature, but this power could only be exercised in the presence of
the governor and six assistant governors.).
151. Id. at 590.
152. Id.
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During the revolutionary years, Alexander Hamilton, advocated for
the consolidation of the power in one Chief Executive, similar to the
English model. 153 Both he and James Iredell argued that the power was
necessary to ensure fairness, and it should be held by only one man. 154
In Federalist No. 74, Alexander Hamilton argued that:
The criminal code of every country partakes so much of necessary
severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor of unfortunate
guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the
sense of responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is
undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready to
attend to the force of those motives which might plead for a mitigation of
the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to considerations which were
calculated to shelter a fit object of its vengeance. 155

In Hamilton’s opinion, the pardoning power was necessary to protect
against a potentially harsh criminal code. 156 For him, one man would be
less likely to give in to political pressure and more likely to understand
the necessity of mitigation in the case of severe laws. His argument won
and the Constitution was ratified by the thirteen states in 1787 with the
power being consolidated solely in the President. 157
2. American Trends
Throughout this country’s history, the pardoning power has been used
for a variety of purposes, including calming and unifying the country
during times of rebellion and political strife, commuting prison
sentences from death to life in prison, and rewarding ex-offenders for
rehabilitation and a commitment to a law-abiding life. 158 Between 1928
and 1980, before the advent and expansion of collateral consequences,
there were at least one hundred post-conviction presidential pardons
granted almost every year. 159 In most years, the President granted more
than one hundred petitions. 160 In other years, over 300 separate pardon
warrants were granted. 161 The percentage of pardons granted remained
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Love, supra note 140, at 1487.
159. Office of the Pardon Attorney, Presidential Clemency by Administration: 1900 to 1945 and
1945 to present, http://www.justice.gov/pardon/statistics.htm (last visited February 21, 2010).
160. Id.; Love, supra note 140, at 1491–92.
161. In 1950, President Truman granted 400 petitions. Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note
159. President Franklin Roosevelt signed well over 2,500 separate pardon warrants and commuted well
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high through these years in every presidential administration beginning
with F.D.R. and ending with Jimmy Carter. 162 The number of pardons
granted signified that the utilization of the power was considered a
customary presidential duty. 163
Something peculiar happened during the Reagan Administration.
During his presidency, the number of pardons dropped significantly.
Reagan pardoned a total of 393 individuals in his two terms, which is
less than half of the number of individuals pardoned by Jimmy Carter in
his four years as President. 164 George H.W. Bush’s grant rate was
lowest for any twentieth century president—seventy-four pardons
granted during his tenure in office. 165 Some may argue that the
dwindling number of pardons is actually a prudent use of the power.

over 400 sentences during his tenure as President. Love, supra note 140, at 1491 n.32.
162. Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 159. This source further provides the following
data on pardons:
President
McKinley (1897–1901)
Roosevelt (1901–1909)
Taft (1909–1913)
Wilson (1913–1921)
Harding (1921–1923)
Coolidge (1923–1929)
Hoover (1929–1933)
FDR (1933–1945)
Truman (1945–1953)
Eisenhower (1953–1961)
JFK (1961–1964)
LBJ (1964–1969)
Nixon (1969–1975)
Ford (1975–1977)
Carter (1977–1981)

No. of Pardons
291
668
383
1087
300
773
672
2799
1913
1110
472
960
863
382
534

163. Love, supra note 140, at 1493.
164. Id. at 1494.
165. Office of the Pardon Attorney, supra note 159. This source provides the following data on
pardons:
President
Reagan (1981–1989)
George H.W. Bush (1989–1993)
Clinton (1993–2001)
George W. Bush (2001–2009)
Obama (2009–2010)
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This argument fails to appreciate the severity and harshness of collateral
consequences in today’s world on non-violent federal offenders. It also
assumes that all offenders are equally dangerous and undesirable.
Since the 1980s, both parties have competed in the “race to
incarcerate” that proliferated with the War on Drugs. The “race to
incarcerate” exponentially increased the national prison population. It
also saw Congress and state legislatures enact an expansive web of
penalties disqualifying individuals based solely on conviction. During
this time, the practice of pardoning became devalued when the Attorney
General delegated his authority to approve clemency applications to
subordinate officials in the Department of Justice, known today as
Pardon Attorneys. 166 These attorneys reflected the perspectives of
prosecutors and may not have had a clear understanding of the clemency
power. 167 Over time, the standards used for granting clemency became
higher resulting in the number of petitions granted becoming lower.168
The number of cases recommended and sent to the White House for
favorable consideration has correspondingly dropped as well. 169
3. Meaning and Effect
What does it mean to be pardoned? What is its legal effect? The text
of the Constitution fails to give any definition or meaning to the term.
Early on, the United States Supreme Court delineated the legal scope of
a pardon in a handful of opinions, but this failed to develop into a clear
characterization leaving lower courts to determine the legal effect of a
pardon.
a. Supreme Court Precedent
One of the original cases discussing the presidential pardoning power
was a decision by the Marshall Court in 1833. 170 In the case of United
States v. Wilson, the Court defined a pardon as:
an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution
of the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from
the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the
private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Love, supra note 140, at 1496.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1497.
United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150 (1833).
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officially to the court. 171

In 1866, Justice Field articulated for the majority the effect of a
pardon in Ex Parte Garland. 172 In that case, the Court struck down an
1865 Act of Congress requiring attorneys of the federal bar to take an
oath affirming they never voluntarily bore arms against the United States
or engaged, assisted, or taken office in a “pretended authority in hostility
to the United States.” 173 The Act was a clear attempt to require
allegiance to the United States from the Confederate bar. Those who
refused the oath were barred from practicing. 174
The petitioner, Attorney A.H. Garland was an Arkansas lawyer and
politician who served as Senator in both the United States and
Confederate Congress and was granted a full pardon after the war of
secession. 175 Garland petitioned the court to continue to practice as an
attorney without taking the oath. 176 He argued the act of Congress was
unconstitutional and that even if it were deemed constitutional, he was
released from the requirement by the pardon of the President. 177 The
Court ruled in favor of Garland finding that a pardon theoretically erases
a conviction. The Court laid out the legal effect of a pardon, writing:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the
guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the
law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence.
If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and
disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to
all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a
new credit and capacity.
There is only this limitation to its operation: it does not restore offices
forfeited, or property or interests vested in others in consequence of the
conviction and judgment. 178

The Garland dissent conceded that a pardon relieves the petitioner
from “all the punishment which the law inflicted for his offence.” 179
This suggests a uniform understanding among the Justices of the legal

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 160.
Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866).
Id. at 334–36.
Id.
Id. at 336–37.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 381–82.
Id. at 396 (Miller, J., dissenting).
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effect of a pardon granted post-conviction. Ultimately, the Court
determined that the 1865 Act was unconstitutional and that it was
beyond the constitutional authority of Congress to impose punishment
outside the reach of executive clemency. 180 Garland was now permitted
to practice and was reborn as a “new man” with “new credit and
capacity” going on to become the Attorney General of the United States
in the first Cleveland administration. 181 The effect given to pardons by
the Court in Garland was further doctrinally entrenched with the case of
Knote v. United States, where the Court held that while a pardon gives
an individual a “new credit and capacity” and “rehabilitates him to the
extent in his former position,” it did not restore confiscated property that
was sold to a third party, where those third party rights have vested. 182
These cases remain good law.
However, in the 1915 case of Burdick v. United States, the Court
handed down an opinion that has since complicated the understood
effect of a pardon. 183 Justice McKenna, writing for the majority,
asserted that an “imputation of guilt” is inherent in a pardon. 184 This
phrase has been interpreted by lower federal courts to stand for the
proposition that a pardon does not have the far reaching effect of
blotting out the existence of guilt.
In Burdick, a judgment of contempt was levied against the defendant
a New York Tribune editor, for his refusal to turnover his source to
prosecutors concerning articles published in the newspaper. 185 Claiming
that his answers might incriminate him, Burdick refused to comply. 186
He was ordered to return later that day where he was handed a full and
unconditional pardon, signed by President Woodrow Wilson. 187 He was
officially absolved of any consequence of any criminal act. 188 Burdick
180. Id. at 381.
181. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
182. Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153–54 (1877). The Court was asked to consider
whether the general pardon and amnesty granted by President Johnson following the civil war entitled
an individual to compensation for loss of property previously confiscated and sold and after such
proceeds were paid into the United States treasury pursuant to the confiscation act of 1862. Justice
Fields, writing for the majority, asserted that a pardon, “[i]n contemplation of law, it so far blots out the
offence, that afterwards it cannot be imputed to him to prevent the assertion of his legal rights.” Id. at
153. However, property confiscated and vested in a third party is not recoverable because the individual
was granted a pardon unless the proceeds or property did not vest in a third party. Id. at. 154.
183. Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 (1915).
184. Id. at 94.
185. Id. at 85.
186. Id. at 85.
187. Id. The pardon was for all offenses he “has committed or may have committed, or taken part
in, in connection with the securing, writing about, or assisting in the publication of” the articles in the
newspaper. Id. at 86.
188. Id. at 85.
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refused to accept the pardon and remained in contempt. 189
The Court was asked to review the judgment and in doing so
answered two constitutional questions: (1) whether the President has the
power to pardon before conviction of an offense and (2) whether it is
necessary for the grantee to “accept” the pardon in order for it to have
full legal effect. 190 The Court answered both questions in the
affirmative. 191 In answering the second question, the Court asserted that
the grantee’s acceptance of a pardon admits guilt. 192 The grantee
“confess[es] his guilt in order to avoid conviction of it.” 193
The Court did not go farther than discussing the offer and acceptance
theory underlying pre-conviction pardons. However, some lower courts
have used the language in Burdick to diminish the unequivocal language
in Ex Parte Garland. This has had major implications in determining
the legal effect a pardon has on post-conviction penalties.
b. Lower Courts
While Ex Parte Garland remains good law, lower federal courts have
used the language in Burdick to interpret the legal effect of a pardon
today. The two cases, taken together, leave some questions open. For
example, does a pardon expunge a criminal history? Will a former felon
still be required to admit his conviction to the general public once
pardoned by the President?
While the Supreme Court has yet to rule on these issues, some lower
courts have determined that a pardon does not expunge the record of
conviction and ex-offenders are required to admit convictions when
asked despite being granted a pardon. 194 The 1990 Third Circuit case of
United States v. Noonan called into question the effect a pardon has on
an individual’s criminal record. 195 Noonan was convicted of draft
violations and pardoned by President Carter. 196 He requested a court
order stating that his pardon had the effect of expunging his criminal

189. Id. at 87.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.at 94.
193. Id.
194. United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1990) (Aldisert, J., reasoning that a grant of a
pardon does not wipe out the conviction); Hirschberg v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 414 F.3d
679 (7th Cir. 2005) (Kanne, J., asserting that the modern case law and the historical language in Ex
Parte Garland are inconsistent with current law); United States v. Bays, 539 F.3d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir.
2009) (Tallman, J., holding that a “pardon does not constitute an expungement”).
195. Noonan, 906 F.2d at 952.
196. Id. at 953–54.
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convictions. 197 Framing the issue as a question of separation of powers,
the court asked whether the executive power to pardon permits the
President to directly or indirectly expunge a judicial branch record. 198
The Third Circuit determined that it does not. 199 Relying heavily on
Burdick, Samuel Williston’s Harvard Law Review exposé on pardons, 200
and the historical evolution of the power in England, the Noonan court
asserted a pardon does not “blot out guilt” nor does it restore an
individual to a state of innocence before the eyes of the law. 201 There is
an “imputation of guilt” in the acceptance of a pardon. 202 A pardon
therefore leaves the record of conviction untouched. 203 For the Third
Circuit, a pardon is nothing more than “an executive prerogative of
mercy.” 204
The Noonan holding has been adopted by many sister circuits and
appears to be the dominant trend throughout the country. 205 The Third
Circuit’s reasoning dismisses the doctrinal and historical significance of
the strong language in both Wilson and Ex Parte Garland. It instead
opts for the language in Burdick, a case regarding the pre-conviction
pardoning authority of the President and having nothing to do with the
legal effect of post-conviction pardons. The Noonan court also ignores
the distinctiveness of American traditions focusing instead on English
customs. Rather than investigating the intent of the American Framers,
Noonan quotes Blackstone and British case law. 206 Moreover, the Third
Circuit completely ignores the many severe collateral consequences of
conviction. The Noonan court offers a holding based on the laws of
Britain, in essence stripping the pardoning power of its intended
197. Id. at 954.
198. Id. at 955.
199. Id.
200. Samuel Williston, Does A Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28 HARV. L. REV. 648, 653 (1915)
(recognizing that while a pardon does remove civil disabilities associated with conviction, it does not
change the character of a pardoned convict, and where character is a qualification for office an offence
(whether pardoned or unpardoned) demonstrates the lack of that qualification).
201. Noonan, 906 F.2d at 958.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 955.
205. See United States v. Bays, 589 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2009) (determining that the Idaho
constitutional statute authorizing pardons did not specifically state that the underlying conviction is
erased from the defendant’s criminal record despite the Idaho Supreme Court’s pronouncement that a
pardon “does away with both the punishment and the effects of guilt”); Hirschberg v. Commodity
Futures Trading Comm’n, 414 F.3d 679 (7th Cir. 2005) (reasoning that the pardon clause was not
violated when the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFMC) took into consideration the
underlying conduct in an insurance fraud scheme that resulted in a felony fraud conviction and
subsequently denied his application to reinstatement as a floor broker).
206. Noonan, 906 F.2d at 959–60.
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American exceptionalism.
c. Office of Legal Counsel
In August 2006, the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel
provided the United States Pardon Attorney with a Memorandum
Opinion regarding whether a presidential pardon expunges judicial and
executive branch records of crime. 207 The office concluded that
expungement is not automatic. 208 It reasoned that Ex Parte Garland has
not been literally applied and that the United States Supreme Court has
appeared to back away from the language in that case. 209 The opinion
relied heavily on Noonan, quoting numerous passages as support.210
However, the opinion came full circle and concluded that:
If a President chose simultaneously to issue a pardon and order the
Executive Branch to expunge any such records, we believe that order
would have the effect intended, subject to any statutory constraints on
executive record keeping. . . . [T]he pardon would not automatically
expunge the records; it would be the President’s separate expungement
order that would require administrative agencies to take action. 211

4. Relevance
If a pardon does not in effect expunge the conviction, then what is its
function and how does it help? The current state of the law shows that
the courts and the executive are ever more confused about the legal
effects of a pardon. The courts have contradicted years of doctrinal
support for the notion that a presidential pardon offers a clean slate and
determined that a pardon does not expunge the record of conviction.
However, the Office of Legal Counsel determined that although not
automatic, a pardon has the ability to require expungement if ordered by
the President.
While there is a legitimate argument that presidential pardons are
subject to abuses including political influences, abuse of discretion, and
abuse of power, there are equally valid historical and textual arguments.
It could be argued that the Framers contemplated potential abuses of the
power and determined that the power was safer in the hands of one man
207. Whether Presidential Pardon Expunges Judicial and Executive Branch Records of a Crime,
Op. Off. Legal Counsel (2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2006/pardonopfinal.pdf.
208. Id. at 6.
209. Id. at 3–5.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 6.
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instead of in the hands of the popular sentiment. 212 The text of the
Constitution reflects this intent, explicitly allowing for unlimited
exercise (except in cases of impeachment) of the power, unchecked, and
completely at the discretion of the President.
Thus far, despite a federal pardon, a felony conviction still stands.
Practically speaking a presidential pardon has no legal significance on
collateral consequences. Today a man granted a pardon is not a “new
man” with “new credit and capacity.” The existence of his guilt is
recorded in a criminal history resulting in continual punishment for the
underlying offense. Today’s pardoned ex-offenders, although not
convicted of treason, are not afforded the same treatment as Garland.
Instead, the stain of conviction remains. One way to correct for the
doctrinal narrowing of the pardon power is to create a class of
legislatively sanctioned expungements.
B. Judicial Petitions for Expungement
While there is nominal, federal statutory authority permitting
legislative expungements, some federal courts have determined that they
have constitutional authority to grant judicial petitions for expungement.
In fact, federal courts have granted petitions for expungement in
“appropriate” cases such as where a defendant was arrested without the
requisite probable cause 213 and where arrests were made for the
deliberate purpose of interfering with the right to vote. 214 A federal exoffender’s ability to obtain a judicial expungement depends largely on
the federal circuit in which the conviction stands.
1. Jurisdiction
To expunge a federal conviction, an ex-offender must move to be
heard in the federal district court where the conviction stands. 215 The
district judge will then decide whether the matter will go forward. As
with all cases, the judge must make a preliminary determination
regarding whether the requisite jurisdiction to proceed to the merits
exists. It is on this point that the federal circuits are split: Do the federal
courts have jurisdiction to hear petitions for judicial expungement? It
depends.
212. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
213. Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
214. United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1967).
215. This information was obtained by a criminal court clerk in the Northern District of Illinois on
February 22, 2010. There is no formal procedure to be heard on an expungement matter.
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The circuit courts differ in their approach. There is currently no
federal statute granting district courts the general authority to expunge
federal records of conviction solely on equitable grounds. There has
been some controversy surrounding the interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231 stating, that “district courts of the United States shall have
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses
against the laws of the United States.” 216 However, it is generally
accepted that § 3231 does not permit equitable jurisdiction over petitions
for criminal expungement. 217
Typical congressional grants of equitable jurisdiction are narrow and
very specific. Federal statutes authorizing federal courts to grant
expungements in equity include the Civil Rights Act, 218 habeas corpus
statutes, 219 and, under the All Writs Act, a writ of error coram nobis 220
to name a few. Under these statutes, district courts have been
specifically granted jurisdiction to hear expungement petitions.
However, if a case does not fall within a statutory grant of jurisdiction,
some courts have found a lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 221
The circuits that have established the jurisdictional requirement to
entertain expungement petitions do so through use of their “inherent”
equitable power. The circuit courts are almost evenly split on the issue
of jurisdiction with the Second, D.C., Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits
finding jurisdiction while the First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth do not. 222
216. United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000).
217. Id.
218. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1983, 1985 (2006).
219. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 (2006).
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).
221. United States v. Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Thus, we hold that in absence
of any applicable statute enacted by Congress, or an allegation that the criminal proceedings were
invalid or illegal, a District Court does not have the jurisdiction to expunge a criminal record, even when
ending in an acquittal.”).
222. Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement
Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (2008). See United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 539
(2d Cir. 1977) (finding equitable jurisdiction to hear petitions for expungement); Menard v. Saxbe, 498
F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (“The judicial remedy of expungement is inherent and is not
dependent on express statutory provision . . . . ”); Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 130 F.3d 695,
697 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that the court has supervisory powers over judicial records); United States v.
Janik, 10 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 1993) (asserting that the court has authority to expunge judicial
records); United States v. Pinto, 1 F.3d 1069, 1070 (10th Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that authority to
expunge is found in the court’s equitable power); United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir.
2007) (holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction to consider defendant’s request for
expungement on equitable grounds); United States v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“[O]ur precedent clearly establishes that we have jurisdiction over petitions for expungement only
when the validity of the underlying criminal proceeding is challenged.”); United States v. Meyer, 439
F.3d 855, 859 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding lack of subject matter jurisdiction regarding expungement of
criminal convictions solely on equitable grounds); United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th
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The Fourth, Sixth, and Eleventh circuits have yet to affirmatively decide
the issue. 223
a. Inherent Equitable Jurisdiction
The circuit courts that have found jurisdiction put forth the doctrine of
“inherent powers” as the basis for their authority. 224 Within these
inherent powers lies ancillary jurisdiction stemming from the court’s
general power to oversee criminal prosecutions. 225 Such authority is
“incidental to the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over a cause under
review.” 226 The equitable power, an explicit constitutional grant, is used
at the court’s discretion to apply justice. 227
The circuits that employ the inherent equitable power doctrine go to
the merits of an expungement petition. Typically the courts use a
balancing test that weighs the petitioner’s interest in avoiding the harm
that results from a conviction against the public’s interest in maintaining
criminal records and promoting effective law enforcement. 228 The
Tenth Circuit has couched the petitioner’s interest in terms of
“privacy.” 229 These courts use the expungement power quite narrowly
and have repeatedly asserted that an expungement will only be granted
in an “exceptional circumstance.” 230 The petitioner needs evidence
demonstrating exceptional hardship due to the conviction or a showing
that the circumstances surrounding the case call for the application of
Cir. 2000) (recognizing ancillary jurisdiction to expunge but not for equitable purposes).
223. United States v. Allen, 742 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1984) (holding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying a request for expungement by an acquittee but failing to address
jurisdictional issue); Thompson v. Rutherford County, Tenn., 318 F. App’x. 387, 388 (6th Cir. 2009)
(majority asserting that “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not addressed the jurisdictional issue, and we need not
decide it here”).
224. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 539; Livingtson v. Dep’t of Justice, 759 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1985);
Janik, 10 F.3d at 472. See also United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 1977); Mouzon, supra
note 222, at 23. Inherent powers vest when the court is created and does not originate from any statute.
225. Mouzon, supra note 222, at 23. See Soo Line R.R. v. Escanaba & Lake Superior R.R. Co.,
840 F.2d 546, 551 (7th Cir. 1988) (asserting that the court has inherent power to make law when
legislation does not address a particular topic); Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 536.
226. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 86 (6th ed. 1990).
227. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Clause 1 states, “[t]he judicial power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States.” Id.
228. Diamond v. United States, 649 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1981) (“If the dangers of unwarranted
adverse consequences to the individual outweigh the public interest in maintenance of records, then
expunction is appropriate.”).
229. United States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 928 (10th Cir. 1975) (“There was no showing . . . that
the retained records have been, or will be, used improperly or intrusively . . . . Thus, there is no
demonstrated invasion of privacy which overrides the Government’s justification in keeping the
records.”).
230. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 538.
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fairness and justice. 231
The “exceptional circumstances” test is not applied uniformly by the
federal circuits. Courts have yet to spell out a clear definition of what
constitutes an “exceptional circumstance.” The Sixth Circuit spoke
when it affirmed a district court’s decision denying the petitioner an
expungement where he was originally named in a federal civil suit and
later dismissed as a defendant. 232 While the Sixth Circuit has yet to
affirmatively decide the jurisdictional issue, the court asserted that this
scenario failed to meet the “exceptional circumstances” threshold that is
used by some courts. 233 However, in a similar Wisconsin district court
case, an expungement of indictment and arrest records were ordered. 234
The defendant, an attorney, had a significant interest in maintaining a
positive status. The court employed the balancing test and found that
the defendant’s interest in maintaining his reputation outweighed the
government’s interest in law enforcement. 235 Noting that the records
were eleven years old, there was no opposition from the government,
and there was no indication the defendant engaged in criminal activity,
the court ordered the records expunged. 236 The court asserted that the
existence of such records represented “an unwarranted slur on his
reputation and character.” 237
In a 2008 Utah district court case, an expungement was granted to a
petitioner twenty years after the conviction. The defendant graduated
from college “with high marks,” got married, had three children with
whom he was very involved, maintained steady employment “while
excelling at the workplace,” and maintained a law-abiding life. 238 The
petitioner also received the blessing of the United States attorney and
provided the court with his company’s policy stating he would not

231. United States v. Holmes, No. MC19990106MDG2005, 2005 WL 1320149, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
June 2, 2005).
232. Thompson v. Rutherford County, Tenn., 318 F. App’x. 387, 389 (6th Cir. 2009).
233. Id. (Keith, J., dissenting on the basis that the district court abused its discretion in failing to
expunge the record as the case “presents an extraordinary circumstance, compelling us to address this
jurisdictional issue and to find that we have ancillary jurisdiction to expunge a record in an appropriate
case”).
234. United States v. Bohr, 406 F.Supp. 1218 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
235. Id. at 1219–20.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 1220.
238. United States v. Williams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1346 (D. Utah 2008). In Williams, the
petitioner/defendant was arrested and pled guilty to one count of distribution of a controlled substance
(cocaine). Id. At the time of his arrest, he was a casual marijuana user and was attempting to obtain
drugs at his friend’s request. Unbeknownst to him, his friend was actually an undercover federal agent.
Id. The petitioner “was sentenced to three years of probation which he completed without incident.” Id.
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advance because of his past criminal conviction. 239 The Tenth Circuit
has emphasized the importance of evidentiary proof of actual harms
suffered by the defendant when petitioning the court for
expungement. 240
b. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Other circuit courts assert that they will use their inherent power to
expunge a conviction that is constitutionally infirm or the result of a
clerical error, but will not use their equitable power to expunge any
other type of conviction. 241 For these circuits, in the absence of a
federal statute or clear defect in the record, a petition for expungement
will not be heard on the theory that equitable orders for expungment do
not fit within the purposes of ancillary jurisdiction espoused by the
Supreme Court in Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance Company of
America. 242 In Kokkonen, the Court asserted that ancillary jurisdiction
exists under two separate principles: “(1) to permit disposition by a
single court of claims that are, in varying respects and degrees, factually
interdependent; and (2) to enable a court to function successfully, that is,
to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its
decrees.” 243
Focusing on the second principle, several circuits
determined that expungement based solely on equitable considerations
does not fall within the scope of this purpose of ancillary jurisdiction. 244
239. Id. at 1348. The court distinguished this petitioner by two main factors: (1) he provided
documentary evidence proving the adverse consequences he faced as a result of his conviction; he
provided the court with his and (2) the United States Attorney supported the petition. Id. The court
quoted the United States Attorney commenting that this is the type of “rare and extreme circumstance”
that warrants the grant of a petition for expungement. Id.
240. United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816, 818 (10th Cir. 1988).
241. United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387, 389–90 (8th Cir. 1978) (“It is established that the
federal courts have inherent power to expunge criminal records when necessary to preserve basic legal
rights. The power is a narrow one, usually exercised in cases of illegal prosecution or acquittals and is
not to be routinely used.”); United States v. Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 480 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Thus, we hold
that in absence of any applicable statute enacted by Congress, or an allegation that the criminal
proceedings were invalid or illegal, a District Court does not have the jurisdiction to expunge a criminal
record, even when ending in an acquittal.”); United States v. Sumner, 226 F. 3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir.
2000) (“In our view, a district court’s ancillary jurisdiction is limited to expunging the record of an
unlawful arrest or conviction, or to correcting a clerical error.”).
242. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375 (1994). The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision of the Eastern District of California enforcing a settlement
agreement between insurer and insurance agent regarding a breach of agency agreement. Id. at 377.
The Court held that under the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, the district court did not have the
inherent power to enforce the agreement. Id.
243. Id. at 379–80 (internal citations omitted).
244. United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 2007) (“We agree with the Third, Eighth,
and Ninth Circuits that Kokkonen answers the question raised . . . . Kokkonen forecloses any ancillary
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Therefore, no such petitions will be heard in those circuits.
These circuits refuse to hear petition for expungement based in
equity. 245 The underlying premise is that federal courts, although
possessessing ancillary jurisdiction, may not preside over matters of
expungement based solely on equitable principles because it constitutes
a violation of separation of powers. 246 Expanding the jurisdiction of
federal courts can only be done by Congress. 247
2. State of the Law
The federal circuit courts are divided over the authoritative power to
grant judicial expungements based solely on equitable principles. The
tension is solely jurisdictional. Despite the fact that the text of the
Constitution clearly states that the jurisdiction of the judicial power
extends to all cases in “Law and Equity,” 248 some circuit courts are
reluctant to assert their equitable power. The fact that the federal
circuits are split on the question of jurisdiction signals that the issue is
ripe for Supreme Court review. Thus, the Court may be inclined to
grant certiorari to resolve the matter. However, if Congress is proactive,
federal policymakers could eliminate the need for Supreme Court review
by crafting a statute explicitly granting federal courts jurisdiction to hear
judicial petitions for expungement.
C. Summary
The Executive and Judicial branches of the federal government could
theoretically grant expungements to non-violent ex-offenders. The
President, after granting a pardon, could provide an order expunging the
record of conviction. The federal courts could find the requisite
jurisdiction to hear petitions for expungement through its inherent
power. However, both of these branches refrain from using the full
jurisdiction to order expungement based on . . . equitable reasons.”); Dunegan, 251 F.3d at 479 (finding
that ancillary jurisdiction as enunciated in Kokkonen does not include petitions for expungement of
criminal records); Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1010 (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 375, as the basis for
restricting judicial power on the issue of criminal expungements).
245. Coloian, 480 F.3d at 52 (“We therefore find that the district court did not have jurisdiction to
consider Coloian’s request for expungement of his criminal record on equitable grounds.”).
246. Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014 (“[T]he expungement of the record of a valid arrest and conviction
usurps the powers that the framers of the Constitution allocated to Congress, the Executive, and the
states.”).
247. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”).
248. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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power granted to them by the United States Constitution. With this,
Congress remains the only branch of government with the constitutional
authority to implement comprehensive federal expungement legislation.
IV. STATES’ EXPERIMENTS WITH OFFENDER REENTRY
States have their own unique process and customs that are typically
codified as a permanent expression of the popular will. With regard to
ameliorating the effects of conviction on its constituent offenders, many
states have a legislatively sanctioned mechanism in place allowing the
offender a chance to clear his criminal history. This Part looks at the
expungement programs offered by three states: Massachusetts,
California, and Connecticut. These three states have implemented
different approaches to successfully integrate the ex-offender into the
community by offering a carrot for those who are productive and remain
crime free. The federal government can look to these state mechanisms
when crafting a solution.
A. Massachusetts
Despite the state’s longstanding tradition of permitting public
inspection of court records, 249 Massachusetts has a statutory mechanism
permitting ex-offenders to petition the Commissioner of Probation to
seal criminal history information. 250 There is also a statutory method
where District Court judges are permitted to seal records of first-offense
possession of marijuana. 251 For purposes of this Article, only the first
approach will be examined.
A sealing in Massachusetts means that the documents are only
accessible by the court, unless the court authorizes limited disclosure. 252
Sealed records allow a defendant to answer “no record” for inquiries by
employers regarding arrests, criminal court appearances, and
convictions. 253 Any application for employment in Massachusetts
where the employer seeks criminal history information must contain
language permitting an applicant with a sealed record to answer “no
record” on the application. 254 Non-compliance could result in a suit in

249. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 66, § 10 (2009) (guaranteeing public access to public records).
250. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (adult criminal dispositions), 100B (juvenile delinquency
dispositions), 100C (not guilty dispositions/no probable cause) (2009).
251. MASS. GEN .LAWS ch. 1102, § 1 (2009).
252. Pixley v. Commonwealth, 906 N.E.2d 320, 328 n.12 (Mass. 2009).
253. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (2009).
254. Id.
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equity taken by the Attorney General in superior court. 255 In addition, a
sealed record does not disqualify a person from public service, and the
record cannot be admitted into evidence except when imposing a
sentence for a subsequent conviction. 256
The process has become fairly standardized requiring the defendant to
apply for a sealing through the Commissioner of Probation. 257 A
specific form must be used, but it is easily accessible and
uncomplicated. 258 The statute requires the Commissioner to comply
with the request so long as there have been no new criminal convictions
or imprisonment, in Massachusetts or elsewhere, the defendant is not
required to register as a sex-offender, there are no statutory exclusions
applicable to the defendant, no firearm convictions, perjury, escape, or
State Ethics Violations, and the statutorily proscribed time period has
elapsed since the last conviction, which is ten years for misdemeanor
crimes and fifteen years for felonies. 259 The clock begins to toll once all
sentence requirements terminate. 260 If all conditions are met, the
Commissioner will seal the record and notify the court clerk and chief
probation officer of the courts in which the convictions stand so that all
records of the proceedings are subsequently sealed. 261
The mechanics of sealing a criminal case are not overly difficult. In
Massachusetts, docket entries are sealed by covering the pertinent
information with opaque tape so that none of the information can be
read. 262 The original docket sheet remains in the docket with “Sealed
Record” recorded on the front. 263 All case papers and related files are
placed in a sealed envelope and are identifiable by the name of the
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Comm’r of Prob., Petition To Seal, available at http://www.masslegalhelp.org/cori/formsand-letters/petition-to-seal-conviction-aged-out-cases.pdf (last visited Sept. 1, 2010). Additionally, the
form can be requested by calling the office of the Commissioner of Probation.
259. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (1) – (4) (2009). There is currently pending legislation
to change the time period to five years for misdemeanors and ten years for felonies. See An Act
reforming the administrative procedures relative to criminal offender record information and pre-and
post-trial supervised release, S. 2220, 186th Cong. § 16 (as passed by Senate, Mass. November 30,
2009); see also Nancy Reardon, Activists Want Law to Seal Criminal Records Sooner, BROCKTON
ENTERPRISE, July 28, 2009, http://www.enterprisenews.com/news/x836550449/Activists-want-law-toseal-criminal-records-sooner (last visited March 18, 2010).
260. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (1), (2) (2009).
261. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 276, § 100A (2009).
262. DIST. COURT DEP’T OF THE TRIAL COURT, COMMONWEALTH OF MASS., A GUIDE TO PUBLIC
ACCESS, SEALING & EXPUNGEMENT OF DISTRICT COURT RECORDS 39 n.121 (2009) available at
http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/districtcourt/pubaccesscourtrecords.pdf (last visited
March 14, 2010).
263. Id.
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defendant and related docket numbers. 264 The sealed envelope is kept in
a secure place out of public reach. 265 A sealed record index is kept by
each department and is not available to the public. 266 A sealed record is
authorized to be used in a manner consistent with statute. 267 In the event
a record is unsealed, the date of the unsealing and the name of the
person using the record are recorded on the front of the envelope. 268
When finished with the information, the record is resealed. 269
B. California
California has in place a dismissal program for misdemeanor and
felony convictions. This system places the authority to dismiss
convictions within the jurisdiction of the courts and does not seal,
destroy, or remove case information from any of the three branches of
government. However, individuals are generally not required to disclose
a conviction if it was dismissed unless the question arises in the context
of government employment or licensing. 270
The process for obtaining a dismissal of prior convictions depends on
the classification of the crime. Theoretically there is no waiting period
for obtaining a dismissal. Defendants may begin the process while on
probation or serving their sentence in county jail. 271 Misdemeanor
convictions require the defendant to petition for dismissal of the
convictions in the superior court where the conviction stands. 272 Felony
convictions where the defendant received a sentence of probation and/or
county jail time are a two-step process. First, a defendant files a petition
to have the felony reduced to a misdemeanor. 273 Once reduction is
secured, the defendant files another petition to have the “misdemeanor”
dismissed in accordance with the misdemeanor petition rules. 274 Felony
convictions where the defendant was sentenced to state prison, to the
custody of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation requires a
ten year waiting period, or to both. 275 This process requires that the
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39 n.122.
Id. at 39 n.121.
Id.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 2010); CAL. CODE REGS tit. 2, § 7287(d) (2009).
See § 1203.4 (not specifying any waiting period).
§ 1203.4.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 17(b) (West 2010).
§ 1203.4.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 4852.01 (West 2010).
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defendant petition the court for a Certificate of Rehabilitation and
subsequently apply for a pardon. 276
C. Connecticut
In Connecticut, absolute pardons have the dual effect of forgiving and
expunging the record of conviction. The governor of Connecticut has
delegated the power to pardon to the Board of Pardons and Parole
(Board). 277 In turn, the Board uses its discretion to determine whether to
grant an individual a provisional pardon, an absolute pardon, or to deny
the petition outright. 278
The applicant may apply three years after completing his sentence for
a misdemeanor and five years after a felony. 279 Typically an individual
will have completed their sentence prior to applying for a pardon.
However, in “extraordinary” circumstances, the Board will grant a
pardon prior to the termination of a sentence. 280
The applicant is required to fill out a ten page questionnaire that
includes the reporting of child support orders, employment history,
criminal history, and basic demographic information. 281 It also requires
that the applicant obtain at least three references, all of whom must be
aware of the applicant’s criminal history, provide the board with the
criminal history printout from the state police and all police reports
related to the applicant’s criminal convictions over the previous ten
years. 282 Once the application is received, the Board notifies the State’s
Attorney and the victim if there is one. 283 Barring a request for a
hearing by the State’s Attorney or victim and after review of the
documentary information, the Board decides whether to grant the
petition through either an absolute or provisional pardon, deny the
petition, or grant the applicant a hearing. 284 If a hearing is granted, the
applicant appears before the Board to answer questions. After the
hearing, the Board either grants or denies the application.
An absolute pardon is an expungement. 285 If granted, the individual
276. Id.
277. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-130a(a) (2010).
278. § 54-130a(b).
279. § 54-130a(c).
280. Id.
281. Board of Pardons and Parole, Expungement/Provisional Pardon Petition, http://www.ct.gov/
doc/lib/doc/PDF/form/PardonFormerOffender.pdf (last visited March 16, 2010).
282. Id.
283. CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 54-142a(d), 54-124a(j)(2), (3) (2010).
284. § 54-124a(j)(2), (3).
285. § 54-142a(d).
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is not required by law to disclose convictions. A provisional pardon is
used for employment purposes only and does not expunge the record of
conviction. 286 The individual is still required to disclose convictions
when asked. 287 However, he can use the provisional pardon as an
advocacy tool. The intended effect of the provisional pardon is to
demonstrate to employers that the Board considers the applicant
trustworthy enough to hire. 288 The applicant may also re-apply for an
absolute pardon in one year. When the Board denies a petition or grants
a provisional pardon, it provides the applicant with the reasoning
underlying its decision, which allows the applicant to conform his
conduct in a manner most conducive to securing a pardon. 289
The Board of Pardons and Paroles uses the pardoning mechanism
quite frequently. Prior to 2004, pardon grants were virtually nonexistent. 290 However, since that time the Board has granted over one
hundred absolute pardons annually and has recently begun to use the
provisional pardon with more consistency. 291
D. Summary
Examining state expungement mechanisms demonstrates that
expungement is considered a viable reentry strategy by state legislators.
Moreover, expungement programs can be crafted and carried out in a
number of different ways with the deciding body being legislative,
judicial, or executive. Little empirical research has been done regarding
the effects of expungement, and research is needed to assess the success
286. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-130a(e) (2010).
287. Id.
288. An Act Concerning Criminal Justice Policy and Planning, H.R. 5781 (Conn. 2006). See also
OFFICE OF LEGAL RESEARCH, H.R. 5781, AN ACT CONCERNING CERTIFICATES OF EMPLOYABILITY AND
REHABILITATION (2006).
289. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-124a(j)(2)(A)(3) (2010).
290. Board of Pardons and Parole, Pardons Counts, http://www.ct.gov/doc/lib/doc/PDF
/PDFReport/PardonsCounts.pdf (last visited March 21, 2010).
291. Id. This source provides the following data:
YEAR

APPLICATIONS RECEIVED

2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009

303
347
393
495
835
1290

NO. OF PARDONS
GRANTED
145
188
220
312 + 4 Provisional
467 + 32 Provisional
413 + 66 Provisional
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or failure of the state programs. However, Connecticut has increasingly
granted pardons over the past six years, and Massachusetts is
considering reducing the waiting period required to obtain a sealing.
While expungement is by no means the absolute solution to reentry, it is
a partial resolution to the growing number of non-violent federal exoffenders who want to lead productive and law abiding lives.
Massachusetts, Connecticut, and California appear to agree that
expungement is a viable response.
V. A CASE FOR CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION
The proliferation of federal criminal statutes in the 1960s effectively
created a federal criminal code. Under the auspices of the Commerce
power, Congress created a new class of criminal—the federal offender.
Unlike the states, which traditionally manage criminal offenders, the
federal government was unprepared to deal with the aftermath of its
legislation. To further compound the matter, Congress enacted
numerous statutes and regulations that triggered collateral consequences
including housing regulations, benefits rules, and federal educational
assistance eligibility. The after-effects now require Congress to develop
an effective, cost-efficient, and workable solution. It is the only branch
of government with the constitutional authority to redirect these
consequences.
As has been demonstrated in Part III, current federal law is confusing
at best. The executive pardoning power does little to successfully
integrate ex-offenders that the President has chosen to pardon. It does
nothing to solve the practical and real life problems associated with
conviction: the easy accessibility of criminal records and the stigma
attached to conviction. It is also quite likely that pardons recently
aroused public suspicion of corruptibility with the Clinton pardons in
2001. 292 A judicial petition for expungement is not a better alternative.
The federal courts remain divided questioning if they even have the
authority to expunge. Not only that, some ex-offenders are deprived of
the opportunity to petition the courts by virtue of the circuit where the
conviction stands. Neither of the two branches provide a reliable postconviction remedy and relief from these branches is seldom granted.
While Congress has already enacted legislation providing assistance
292. Editorial, An Indefensible Pardon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2001, at A18 (opining that Clinton’s
pardon of Marc Rich, a commodities dealer who fled prosecution to Switzerland, was indefensible and
arguing that there is a difference between pardoning someone who pays in full and someone who
purposely avoids adjudication); Editorial, The Pardons Look More Sordid, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2001, at
A22 (reporting that President Clinton may have discussed a pardon with a Democratic fundraiser).
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for the reentering releasee, these initiatives did not and do not go far
enough. Beginning in the late 1960s, Congress began to show lukewarm
concern for the economic position of ex-offenders. Legislators worked
to provide incentives to employers with the goal of influencing hiring
practices. In 1966, the United States Department of Labor (USDOL)
created the Federal Bonding program, 293 and the Reagan Administration
implemented the Work Opportunity Tax Credit. 294 Both of these
programs were aimed at assisting ex-offenders, among other
disadvantaged groups, in securing employment from private sector
employers. These programs provided limited assistance in one
fundamental area in a time where collateral consequences existed and
were not as potent.
Arguably, Congress could repeal or modify existing federal statutes
and regulations that work as post-conviction penalties. While possible,
this approach is open to two criticisms: (1) it leaves the problem of
employer access wide open; and (2) there are an overwhelming number
of statutes and regulations. Without expungement, private employers
maintain the ability to inquire into the criminal history of an individual
before even extending an offer of employment. Disqualification on the
basis of a criminal conviction would likely continue. 295 Title VII does
not prohibit discrimination on the basis of a criminal record. 296 Second,
there are numerous statutes and regulations that impose collateral

293. Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962, 42 U.S.C. § 2571 (repealed 1969, but
adopted by State and local operating agencies). The Federal Bonding Program guarantees the employer
honesty from a high-risk job seeker. High-risk job seekers are those who have committed acts deemed
fraudulent or dishonest in the past or who have demonstrated past behaviors that make their honesty or
credibility questionable. This includes ex-offenders. Historically, employers have not hired from this
category of job applicants on a variety of grounds. A major reason for the exclusion of ex-offenders is
that commercial bond insurance companies do not cover this group as they are designated as “NOT
BONDABLE.” The Federal Bonding program, however, provides commercial insurance to the
employer free of charge for six months as an incentive to hire high-risk job seekers. The insurance will
reimburse the employer for any losses due to employee dishonesty with no deductible amount to the
employees. Once the employee demonstrates job honesty for six months then he or she will be
considered bondable for life under the commercially Fidelity Insurance bonds.
294. I.R.C. § 51 (2006). The Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) is a federal tax credit that is
available to all private sector businesses. The original purpose was as an incentive to private sector
employers to hire individuals from targeted groups, who traditionally experience high rates of
unemployment. Individuals who have been convicted of a felony and were hired more than one year
after the last date on which he was convicted or released from prison, qualifies the employer to receive
the tax credit. Employers will receive a $2400 tax credit for each ex-offender hired who has worked a
minimum of 120 to 400 hours.
295. Although many states have statutes prohibiting such discrimination, individuals rarely use
them because of the issues of proof. Employers rarely write the reason for not selecting a candidate and
even when they do it is likely general standard denial.
296. It is likely that an amendment to Title VII including the prohibition of discrimination on the
basis of a criminal conviction would suffer from the same shortfalls as the state statutes.
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consequences. It would likely take significant resources and political
will to sift through, sort, and modify decades of legislation.
It is also possible that Congress could statutorily prescribe jurisdiction
to the federal courts to grant expungements. Doing so could potentially
clog the dockets of federal courts and divert resources from customary
court matters. Moreover, expungement would then be subject to
discretionary judgment. Giving the courts jurisdiction would remove
transparency from the process.
A. A New Approach
The purpose behind expungement is to wipe the proverbial slate
clean, allowing formerly convicted citizens to live in America without a
lifelong struggle with collateral consequences. In the context of crime
and recidivism, expungement could be a tool to integrate ex-offenders
into the community through an incentive structure. This structure would
be transparent, practicable, and codified. Interestingly, Congress has
already experimented with this type of system: it created a quasiexpungement system with the Bankruptcy Code. Bankruptcy itself is
designed with the purpose of discharging one’s debt. 297 This discharge
prevents creditors from any further collection. 298 A central aspect of
bankruptcy policy is the concept of the “fresh start;” 299 debtors should
have the ability to live a dignified life and not be forced into a
permanently impoverished existence. 300 In calculating a cost-benefit
analysis, a debtor can do better for himself and his community when
released from financial liabilities and restored to solid economic
footing. 301
The same rationale may be applied to the non-violent federal
offender. Once the offender discharges his debt to society, further
collection on that debt, in the form of life-long collateral consequences,
should be barred. Normatively speaking, an offender is likely to do
better for himself and his community once he is released from collateral
liabilities and allowed to maximize his opportunities. Thus, Congress
can apply the theoretical justifications and safeguards that protect
debtors in bankruptcy to the situation of federal offenders and
297. Charles Jordan Tabb, The Historical Evolution of the Bankruptcy Discharge, 65 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 325, 370 (1991).
298. JEFF FERRIELL & EDWARD J. JANGER, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 456 (2d ed. 2007).
299. Bernard R. Trujillo, The Wisconsin Exemption Clause Debate of 1846: An Historical
Perspective on the Regulation of Debt, 1998 WIS. L. REV. 747 (1998).
300. Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96 MICH. L.
REV. 47 (1997).
301. Trujillo, supra note 299, at 762.
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expungement. This taken together with the objectives outlined in the
Second Chance Act can provide a principled framework for federal
expungement legislation. Both call for a second chance for the
defendant.
1. Structure
As discussed in Part II, recidivism rates among non-violent offenders
decline with the passage of time. 302 After three years post release, the
likelihood of recidivism is two per one thousand individuals
recidivating. Non-recidivists having kept themselves out of prison
should be permitted to petition society for a clean slate some time after
completion of their sentence. Having a publicly accessible criminal
conviction will work as a lifelong cost the non-recidivist pays in future
potential opportunity. Upon a showing of a law-abiding and productive
life as defined by eligibility criteria, the non-recidivist should have an
opportunity to petition for society’s acceptance of full integration in the
American social order.
The U.S.S.C. should create a Second Chance Advisory Group to
determine how best to ameliorate the collateral consequences of federal
convictions. As part of the judicial branch, the U.S.S.C. already has in
place the resources, access and structural support needed to investigate,
craft, and execute a post-conviction expungement initiative. 303 The
congressional mandate of the U.S.S.C., namely to provide Congress
with recommendations regarding the sentencing guidelines, places the
purpose of a Second Chance Advisory Group in line with the legislative
purpose of theU.S.S.C. 304 With a Second Chance Advisory group, the
U.S.S.C. may be used as a vehicle for researching and recommending
legislative policy initiatives that will effectively slash both incarceration
and opportunity costs. It has been given nearly unlimited access to
almost any federal, state, and local resources needed to efficiently fulfill
its obligations. 305
302. HARER, supra note 6, at 9.
303. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2006).
304. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2) (2006) (“Duties of the Commission (a) The Commission, by
affirmative vote of at least four members of the Commission, and pursuant to its rules and regulations
and consistent with all pertinent provisions of any Federal statute shall promulgate and distribute to all
courts of the United States and to the United States Probation System— . . . (2) general policy
statements regarding application of the guidelines or any other aspect of sentencing or sentence
implementation that in the view of the Commission would further purposes set forth in section
3553(a)(2) of title 18, United States Code . . . .”). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2006) (setting forth
the application and implementation procedures of the sentencing guidelines).
305. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 995 (2006); see also 28 U.S.C. § 995(a)(5) (2006) (“The
Commission, by vote of a majority of the members present and voting, shall have the power to . . . (5)
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The creation of a Second Chance Advisory group would not be
innovative, as the U.S.S.C. has previously created advisory groups for
the purpose of facilitating “formal and informal input to the
Commission.” 306 Currently, there are three advisory groups to the
U.S.S.C. 307 These include the Probation Officers Advisory Group, the
Practitioners Advisory Group, and the Victims Advisory Group. 308 This
seems to be the next logical step in fully addressing federal criminal
recidivism.
2. Duties
A Second Chance Advisory Group could be the lead agency on
federal offender reentry. This group could conduct fresh and current
recidivism studies specifically aimed at BOP releasees giving the
U.S.S.C. the updated data needed to craft sound legislative policy. A
Second Chance Advisory group would have the ability to investigate and
evaluate successful state sealing or expungement programs paying
particular attention to collateral consequences, e.g., exceptions to
statutory collateral consequences and administrative procedures for relicensing, and restoration of civil rights statutes. This group could
develop efficient and workable evidence-based programs proven to
smooth the transition from prison to society. The primary objective
would be to craft a recommendation or amendment to the U.S.S.C.
aimed at combating the numerous collateral consequences arising out of
conviction in the federal system. One such remedy could be the
development and implementation of a federal expungement procedure.
The Second Chance Advisory Group could be charged with thinking
through many issues, including whether expungement would be
automatic after certain eligibility criteria were met; determining the
required post-conviction waiting period; the agency to which
applications would be addressed; whether this procedure would be
administrative; whether this remedy would be subject to review; how
federal expungement would interact with state law. The group could
also consider other issues and remedies including the repeal of statutory
utilize, with their consent, the services, equipment, personnel, information, and facilities of other
Federal, State, local, and private agencies and instrumentalities with or without reimbursement
therefore . . . .”).
306. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 4 (2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/general/RULES11_01.pdf.
307. Id.
308. Id. See also U.S. Probation Officers Advisory Group, Charter, http://www.ussc.gov/POAG/
charter.html (last visited February 26, 2010); Practitioners Advisory Group, http://www.ussc.gov/PAG/
PAGindex.html (last visited February 26, 2010).
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and regulatory collateral consequences and expanded expungement
authority.
3. Recommended Recidivism Risk Assessment
Expunging a criminal conviction is a matter of serious public concern.
Before American society expunges criminal convictions, it wants to
make sure that individuals will not reoffend. On one hand, no such
guarantees can be made. The government can never guarantee that an
individual will not recidivate because human behavior itself is uncertain.
On the other hand, there are tools that assist in predicting the likelihood
of recidivism and that make fewer errors than human judgment—
statistical methods of prediction. 309
Statistical devices for predicting recidivism have been used by the
federal government in the past. For example, they have been used in the
context of parole prior to its abolition. 310 In 1928, E.W. Burgess
described his classic work in prediction methods. 311 In an experiment
conducted thirty years later by Gottfredson, the results were the same:
the statistical prediction fared better. 312 Indeed, statistical prediction
analysis has consistently fared better than clinical judgments. 313 In
1957, Paul Meehl conducted a similar study and found the same
results. 314 The decision makers’ subjective biases and prejudices are
excluded from the prediction table making the process more objective
than if left to human judgment.
The decision to parole an individual was primarily based on the
individual offender’s risk of violating conditions and/or re-offending. 315
The statistical tool used by the United States Board of Parole to predict

309. PAUL MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION 90–119 (1954) (comparing
clinical and statistical methods of prediction in twenty studies including corrections and education with
approximately half showing statistical superiority and the other half showing almost no difference);
JOAN NUFFIELD, PAROLE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA: RESEARCH TOWARDS DECISION GUIDELINES
12 (1983). See also Andrew Vachss, Parole as Post-Conviction Relief: The Robert Lewis Decision, 9
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 20–27 (1975).
310. LLOYD E. OHLIN, SELECTION FOR PAROLE: A MANUAL of PAROLE PREDICTION 23 (1951).
311. E.W. Burgess, Factors Making For Success or Failure On Parole, in THE WORKINGS OF THE
INDETERMINATE-SENTENCE LAW AND THE PAROLE SYSTEM IN ILLINOIS (Andrew A. Bruce et al. eds.,
1928).
312. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME (1967).
313. NUFFIELD, supra note 309, at 14.
314. Id.
315. Anne M. Heinz et al., Sentencing By Parole Board: An Evaluation, 67 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2 (1976).
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that risk was the Salient Factor Score (SFS). 316 The SFS was an
instrument originally developed from Burgess’s 1928 study of three
Illinois correctional facilities. 317 Burgess crafted a twenty-one–factor
test used to grade inmates with the purpose of determining the likelihood
of parole success. 318 In the 1970s, Peter Hoffman, then director of
research at the United States Board of Parole, crafted and implemented
the SFS 319 . The SFS included only nine out of the original twenty-one
selection criteria and has recently been determined to be a better
predictor of recidivism than the U.S.S.C.’s use of the Criminal History
Category (CHC). 320
The use of a statistical tool modeled after the actuarial tables of
Burgess and the SFS could be employed in order to: (1) predict the
likelihood of recidivism for individual petitioners; (2) create a uniform
risk assessment tool based on codified eligibility criteria; (3) allow for
transparency; and (4) collect data for future recidivism studies as well as
investigate successful integration strategies. As with all statistical tools,
this model has advantages and disadvantages.
The problems with the prediction tables are inherent in any statistical
approach. A perfect statistical model would take the uncertainty out of
the equation. 321 However, prediction tables are rarely 100% efficient. 322
Human behavior and environmental pressure may never be totally
captured by predictive analysis. 323
a. Eligibility Criteria
Eligibility criteria should be modeled after the best predictive factors
of recidivism. The most useful information will be obtained through upto-date studies tracking recidivism for specific cohorts. This data will
serve to inventory characteristics of successful release. In addition,
studies conducted by Burgess to Lloyd Ohlin and Peter Hoffman are rich
in information regarding best predictive factors. Reassessing this
information could potentially provide a spring board for a new statistical
316. Peter B. Hoffman, History of the Federal Parole System: Part 2 (1973–1997), 61 FED.
PROBATION 49, 49 (1997).
317. Burgess, supra note 311.
318. Id. at 221.
319. Hoffman, supra note 316, at 49–52.
320. MEASURING RECIDIVISM, supra note 6, at 1–2, 12 (explaining that the SFS was designed to
measure only recidivism while the CHC was used to measure recidivism and reflect offender
culpability).
321. NUFFIELD, supra note 309, at 14–15.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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model. The use and success of previous statistical tools, such as the SFS
and CHC, should also be analyzed. Taken together, this should be
enough information to construct an up-to-date statistical tool used for the
dual purpose of predicting the likelihood of recidivism in the context of
expungement and also serving as eligibility criteria for a potential
petitioner.
4. Clinical Judgment
While statistical models of prediction fare better than clinical
judgments, it would be an error to discount the value in human opinion.
Human judgment could contribute in those borderline, “hard-to-tell”
cases: those cases where an individual falls within a statistical range
where the likelihood of recidivism could go either way. With this, a
Second Act Commission could be created and called on to determine
those cases on a case by case basis and through a codified hearing
procedure. Such a Commission should consist of a diverse mix of
persons and have an odd number of members. They could serve as
hearing officers in those intermediate cases, allowing individuals to
present themselves before making a determination on the petition. The
Second Chance Advisory Group could research and experiment with
different systems until it has discovered the best and most effective
system to break the cycle of criminal recidivism, preferably by giving
non-violent federal offenders the opportunity of a clean slate.
B. Concerns with Expungement
At this juncture, there are many questions and concerns with respect
to a federal legislative expungement program. One question regards the
right of the public to inspect public records. The Supreme Court
provided guidance on this issue in Nixon v. Warner Communications,
Inc. 324 In that case the court firmly asserted, “that the right to inspect
and copy judicial records is not absolute. Every court has supervisory
power over its own records and files, and access has been denied where
court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes.” 325
While it is America’s practice to allow the copy and inspection of public
documents, it is not an unlimited right. There are also individual privacy
rights that should be respected and balanced. “It is the unwarranted
invasion of individual privacy which is reprehended and to be, so far as

324. Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1970).
325. Id. at 1312.
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possible, prevented.” 326 These two rights should be balanced in order to
maximize the benefit to American society.
Another argument asserts that expunging a criminal conviction would
also prevent employers from obtaining a full and accurate history of
prospective employees. Wanting to know the criminal background of
individuals who will have expansive access to cash registers and retail
merchandise is a legitimate concern. However, an expungement
program would serve as a character screening tool for society in general.
Moreover, there must be some point where the law recognizes the
individual’s “right to be let alone.” 327 After expungement, an individual
should be allowed to pick up where he left off without intrusions into his
past. He is to begin anew with a clean slate.
An expungement system may encounter problems on a different front.
Many private companies have entered the criminal records business by
“mining” criminal information from state systems. 328 These companies
then turn around and sell this information to anyone for a price. 329
Expunging an individual’s criminal history may not prevent this
information from being completely out of public reach. Private
ownership of this information could cause major intellectual property,
constitutional, and contractual issues. This is an issue that the Second
Chance Advisory Group would be charged with resolving.
C. Summary
While Congress has implemented legislation aimed at providing
employer incentives for hiring ex-offenders, it has fallen short of
successfully integrating individuals back into mainstream society. It has
especially failed to manage reentry for federal ex-offenders. The
creation of a Second Chance Advisory Group could begin the process of
resolving the pressing issues of over-incarceration, federal offender
reentry, and collateral consequences. As noted above, the first step
begins with empirical studies aimed at investigating current federal
recidivism trends, successful state reentry programs, and general
attitudes toward non-violent offenders and expungement. With the data
collected from these studies, the Second Chance Advisory Group can
provide Congress with guidance and a variety of recommended
326. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 214
(1890).
327. Id. at 193.
328. John Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained To The Past: An Overview of Criminal Expungement
Law In Minnesota – State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1334 (2005).
329. Id.
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legislative initiatives to address non-violent offender reentry.
VI. CONCLUSION
It is understood that in civilized nations criminal law and prison serve
an important purpose—they punish criminal behavior. In America, the
punishment does not end after imprisonment. Federal and state
regulations continue punishment long after release. This works to bar
ex-offenders from employment, education, housing, and participating in
the political process, forcing the ex-offender to take part in the criminal
underworld for money, social acceptance, and community engagement.
This typically results in a return to prison and loss of opportunity. The
cycle of criminality perpetuates itself while the costs of incarceration
soar.
While not a perfect system the creation of a Second Chance Advisory
Group, could begin to provide answers and offer remedies to a number
of different concerns. This group would have the resources to conduct
thorough empirical studies regarding the issues confronting federal exoffenders while simultaneously combing the country for successful
evidence-based programs to emulate and implement as part of the
federal criminal justice system. As demonstrated in Part III, pardons are
symbolic and judicial petitions are rare. Currently, there is no legal
mechanism available to non-violent federal offenders to clear their
names even after decades of productivity and law-abiding conduct.
America, hailed the “land of second chances,” appears to be a
rhetorical myth to the millions of Americans that have served their time
in the federal penitentiary only to be black-balled from American
society. Incarceration and recidivism are no longer a sustainable option
not only for ex-offenders but for the national economy as well.
Something must be done to resolve this issue, and Congress is the
branch that must lead the charge.
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